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WATER PRIVATIZATION TRENDS IN THE UNITED
STATES: HUMAN RIGHTS, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND
PUBLIC STEWARDSHIP*
CRAIG ANTHONY (TONY) ARNOLD**
OVERVIEW
Current debates in U.S. law and politics seem to be questioning
whether national security and human rights are in fundamental tension
with each other, as our legal and political systems struggle with the scope
of government powers to fight terrorism and the legal limits on the de-
tention, interrogation, and punishment of suspected terrorists, such as
those held at Guantanamo Bay, among other issues.1 This Article will
address an area of law and public policy in which the shared (or common)
interests of both national security and human rights receive too little
attention. It is the area of privatization of water and public water services
and infrastructure.
The Article will focus on water privatization trends in the United
States. In particular, it will discuss three aspects of water privatization
in the U.S.: 1) the privatization of public water services, 2) private property
rights in water, and 3) water as a consumer commodity. These trends
arise in the context of global water privatization trends and the opposition
of human rights advocates and environmentalists to private corporate
exploitation of water for profit. They arise in the context of the legal and
socio-cultural history of private property rights in the United States.
* Aversion of this Article was given as a lecture for the Distinguished Lecture Series of the
Human Rights and National Security Law Program at the College of William and Mary
Marshall-Wythe School ofLaw on September 16,2008. Professor Arnold thanks Professor
Linda Malone for her organization of the lecture, kind invitation, and gracious hospitality.
** Boehl Chair in Property and Land Use, Professor of Law, Affiliated Professor of Urban
Planning, and Chair of the Center for Land Use and Environmental Responsibility,
University of Louisville, and Visiting Scholar, University of Cincinnati School of Planning,
2008-2009. Professor Arnold thanks Dustin Wallen, Simone Spector, and Sherry Fuller
for their excellent research assistance.
'See, e.g., Rosa E. Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and the Law
of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675 (2004); Kenneth Anderson,
U.S. Counterterrorism Policy and Superpower Compliance with International Human
Rights Norms, 30 FoRDHAM INTL L.J. 455 (2007).
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They arise in the context of tensions between the private and public
nature of water; economic efficiency and social equity; globalization and
local control; resource development and resource conservation; and the
meaning of water as an economic good and as the ecological, ethical, reli-
gious, and social meanings of water.
For example, the water woes of the state of Georgia illustrate the
power of water privatization and commodification forces in U.S. society
and their deleterious effects. In recent years, Georgia has had at least
eleven public water systems operated by private water companies.2 Most
famously, Atlanta granted a twenty year contract to United Water in 1998
to operate its municipal water system, which Atlanta terminated just four
years later for quality-of-service and mismanagement problems.3 Water
often had to be boiled due to insufficient water pressure, ran a rusty brown
color, and did not even reach many customers for lengthy periods due to
backlogged work orders.4
The water problems of Atlanta and Georgia have extended far
beyond poorly-run municipal systems to problems of water scarcity and
conflict. Once considered to be water abundant, the U.S. Southeast now
struggles with drought, relentless and growing demand for water, deplet-
ing water sources, and persistent conflicts among major water users.5
Georgia has found itself in water crisis due to legal and political institu-
tions' accommodation of consumer demand for both water and energy
produced by water: a growing population particularly in the sprawling
Atlanta metropolitan area, recreational users of water, agricultural irri-
gators, power generators, and industries like pulp and paper mills, textiles,
chemical manufacturing facilities, and the mining industry.6 For example,
Georgia's population grew by over 140% between 1950 and 2000, and its
2 See Institute for Agriculture & Trade Policy [IATP], Trade Observatory, U.S. Water
Privatization: Georgia, http://www.tradeobservatory.org/waterprivatizationindex.cfin
?state=ga (last visited Feb. 13, 2009).
'See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
'See id.
See, e.g., Kristen Choo, Gulp: Litigation Won't End the Battles Over Depleted Water
Resources in Several Regions of the United States, ABA JOURNAL, Sept. 2008, at 56-6 1;
Catherine D. Little, Eastern Water Law: Less Water, More Change, TRENDS: ABA SEC. OF
ENV~r, ENERGY, AND RESOURCES NEWSL., MarJApr. 2008, at 8-9; Janet C. Neuman, Have
We Got a Deal for You: Can the East Borrow from the Western Water Marketing Experience?,
21 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 449, 449-51, 479-85 (2004); J.B. Ruhl, Equitable Apportionment of
Ecosystem Services: New Water Law for New Water Age, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 47,
47-48 (2003).
r See Neuman, supra note 5, at 479-80.
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agricultural withdrawals from the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint
("ACF") River System increased by 1320% just between 1970 and 1990. 7
However, the state and local governments have done little to
constrain sprawl, mandate water-conservation techniques in design and
development, or manage growth based on sustainable and secure water
supplies.' In addition, Georgia's statutes regulating riparian rights to
water through permits for water allocation have largely exempted agri-
cultural water users, the largest category of water use in the state.9 In-
stead, Georgia has attempted to satisfy its diverse and powerful interest
groups' water demands by increasing withdrawals from the ACF system-
primarily though increased withdrawals from Lake Lanier, to the detri-
ment of its neighbors, Alabama and Florida- and the ecology of the sys-
tem. ° Georgia also is seeking to redraw its boundary with Tennessee so
that it can obtain rights to water in the Tennessee River, which currently
does not cross into Georgia."'
The Georgia state government finally adopted the state's first state-
wide comprehensive water management plan in February 2008--only
after experiencing sustained drought and losing to Alabama and Florida
in an action enjoining Georgia's additional withdrawals from Lake Lanier."
The Georgia Department of Natural Resources issued a draft of a water
7 Id. at 479-80 & nn.166 & 172.
8 See SPRAWL CITY: RACE, POLITICS, AND PLANNING IN ATLANTA 8-10 (Robert D. Bullard,
Glenn S. Johnson & Angel 0. Torres eds., 2000); Christine A. Klein, On Integrity: Some
Considerations for Water Law, 56 ALA. L. REV. 1009, 1011 (2005).
' See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Georgia Water Law: How to Go Forward Now?, at 6-7,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2005 GEORGIA WATER RESOURCES CONFERENCE, available at
http'//www.gwri.gatech.edu/conferences/previous-gwrc-conferences/gwrc-2005/.
'o For several analyses of the ACF conflict, see JOHN COPELAND NAGLE & J.B. RUHL, THE
LAW OF BIODIVERSITY AND ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT 622-29 (2002); Steven Leitman,
Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint Basin: Tri-State Negotiations of a Water Allocation
Formula, in ADAPTIVE GOVERNANCE AND WATER CONFLICT: NEW INSTITUTIONS FOR
COLLABORATIVE PLANNING 74-88 (John T. Scholz & Bruce Stiftel eds., 2005); Joseph W.
Dellapenna, Interstate Struggles Over Rivers: The Southeastern States and the Struggle
Over the 'Hooch, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 828, 830-31 (2005); Klein, supra note 8, at 1064-
67; Neuman, supra note 5, at 479-85; Ruhl, supra note 5, at 48; J.B. Ruhl, Water Wars,
Eastern Style: Divuying Up theApalachicola-Chattahoochee-FlintRiver Basin, J. CONTEMP.
WATER RES. & EDUC., June 2005, at 47, 47 (2005).
1 See Choo, supra note 5, at 58.
12See Fed. Power Customers, Inc. v. Green, 514 F.3d 1316, 1318 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (decided
Feb. 5, 2008), cert. denied sub nom. Georgia v. Florida, No. 08-199 (Jan. 12, 2009); Press
Release, Governor Sonny Perdue, Georgia, Governor Perdue Signs Water Plan into Law
(Feb. 6,2008), available at http'//gov.georgia.gov/00/press/detail/0,2668,78006749_78013037
105162841,00.html.
2009]
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL"Y REV.
conservation plan in December 2008.'3 The Georgia Chamber of Commerce,
however, has insisted that any comprehensive water planning for Georgia
recognize that water rights in Georgia are private property with which
the legislature cannot interfere and should be freely transferable by the
owner.'4 In fact, the new state water plan allows for inter-basin transfers
while relying on soft study and planning techniques, instead of hard allo-
cations. 15 Atlanta's recent metropolitan plans for water conservation are
modest at best. 6 Georgia's persistent treatment of water as a private con-
sumer good, instead of a necessary public resource, is especially remarkable
considering that Governor Sonny Perdue declared a state of emergency in
northern Georgia in October 2007 when dangerously low levels of water
in Lake Lanier put area residents arguably within 90 days of running out
of water.'7
13 GEORGIA DEP'T OF NATURAL RES., ENvTL. PROT. Div., THE WATER CONSERVATION
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN (2008), available at http://www.georgiawcip.org/PDF/WCIP-
DRAFT-December2008.pdf.
14 See Gregory W. Bount et al., The Role of Water Rights and Georgia Law in Compre-
hensive Water Planning for Georgia: A White Paper to the Joint Comprehensive Water
Plan Study Committee 1 (Georgia Chamber of Commerce, Mar. 2002), available at
http://www.troutmansanders.com/mc/art-pickett2.pdf. In a bankruptcy case in south-
eastern Georgia, the court determined that a paper company's permit to withdraw ground-
water was private property and must be auctioned at an interstate sale as an asset or
commodity to be marketed. See Patricia McIntosh, Battle Looms Over Water Rights as
Private Property Assets, SAVANNAH MORNING NEws, July 20,2005, httpJ/old.savannahnow
.comstories/072005/3172401.shtml.
5 See Debbie Gilbert, Green Group Says Georgia Water Plan is No Plan at All, GAINESVILLE
TIMES, Feb. 2,2008, available at http://www.gainesvilletimes.com/news/archive/2851; see
also Lyle V. Harris, WaterPlan is Diluted and Deluded, ATLANTAJ.-CONST., Jan. 8,2008,
atA12, available at httpJ/www.cviog.uga.edu/spotlightlnews/item.php?print=y&id=529..
1 See Stacy Shelton, Metro Water Plan: What Level of Commitment?, ATLANTAJ.-CONST.,
Jan. 18, 2009, http://www.ajc.com/services/content/printedition/2009/01/18/waterplan
01183dot.html; see also PACIFIC INSTITUTE FOR STUDIES IN DEVELOPMENT, ENVIRONMENT,
AND SECURITY, A REvIEW OF WATER CONSERVATION PLANNING FOR THE ATLANTA, GEORGIA
REGION 4 (2006), available at httpJ/www.pacinst.org/reports/atlanta/atlanta-analysis.pdf.
17 Kristen Johnson, Georgia Governor Calls for State of Emergency Due to Drought
(WDEF News 12 television broadcast Oct. 20, 2007), available at http://www.wdef.com/
news/georgia-governor-calls for state-of emergency-dueto.drought/lO/2007. But see
Georgia Governor, Corps Differ Over Extent of Water Emergency, CNN, Oct. 20, 2007,
http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/10/20/georgia.drought/index.html (reporting that the U.S.
Army Corps ofEngineers disputed the Governor's assessment of the drought emergency).
However, Governor Perdue ordered reductions in water consumption and limits on certain
uses (e.g., residential lawn watering) during the emergency period. See Jeffrey Scott,
Georgians Reduce Water Consumption by 13 Percent, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Jan. 25, 2008,
at A8, available at httpJ/ajc.com/travel/content/metro/stories/2008/01125/droughtLO126
.html%253Fcxntlid%253Dinformartr.
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This Article argues that privatization of water and public water
systems pose underappreciated risks to both public rights and national
security in the United States. All life depends on water. Therefore, all
communities, social and political systems, and economies depend on this
finite resource for survival and vitality. However, both human rights and
national security protections are inadequate to guarantee that all people
will receive sufficient quantities of good quality water to meet basic human
needs. These inadequacies result from the deeply entrenched conceptualiza-
tion of rights in the United States, the fact that human rights and national
security policies are not self-implementing, and the particular character-
istics of water. Individual rights to water or protections against terrorist
threats to water supplies do not necessarily achieve water conservation,
sustainable management of water and watersheds, or long-term planning
and investment.
Instead, the United States needs legislation and legal doctrines
that limit private control over water sources and systems and that regu-
late privatization processes in order to protect the integrity and security
of individuals, communities, and the nation. Even more importantly, the
United States needs comprehensive principles of public stewardship of
water resources to support human life and national security. Public stew-
ardship principles are premised on the concept that the government is a
trustee of water resources for the public, a fiduciary obligation not limited
to the traditional public trust doctrine, but based in the many public char-
acteristics of water in the United States, as well as the social and human
necessities of a complex society. However, each member of the public would
not only be a beneficiary but would also owe duties to his, her, or its co-
beneficiaries, the other members of the public. Public stewardship prin-
ciples would require long-range place-based planning with transparency
and public participation, public investment, water conservation, watershed
protection, water quality controls, full-cost pricing with subsidies to those
unable to pay full costs, and heightened security measures.
Part I describes the trend towards water privatization in the United
States. First, it explores the privatization of public water services, includ-
ing: 1) status and trends, 2) causes, and 3) conflicts and failures. Then,
Part I examines the legal doctrines, public policies, and cultural norms
treating water as an object of private property rights. Lastly, Part I dis-
cusses water as a consumer commodity. Part II turns to the human rights
aspects of water privatization in the United States, concluding that human
rights legal theories lack the capacity to resolve the underlying concerns
about meeting the human need for water. Part III examines several aspects
20091 789
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of national security that are exacerbated by privatization and commodifi-
cation of water: 1) conflict and scarcity, 2) foreign control of domestic water
supplies, and 3) terrorism. However, national security policy is better
equipped to address terrorist threats to water supplies than to address
the larger issues of long-term water governance to ensure secure, stable,
and sustainable supplies for the public. Finally, Part IV argues that the
public needs water laws and policies that protect and facilitate the integ-
rity and sustainability of human and natural water systems. Although
human rights theories and national security policies may be insufficient
by themselves to achieve this goal, a new concept of public stewardship of
water would create new institutional capacity and responsibility to achieve
this goal by imposing six fiduciary duties on state governments and the
federal government for the benefit of the public: 1) the duty of security;
2) the duty of conservation; 3) the duty of sustainability; 4) the duty of
equity; 5) the duty of investment; and 6) the duty of long-range, place-
based planning. Members of the public, while being beneficiaries of these
duties, would also share responsibility for acting on them.
I. WATER PRIVATIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES
While the term "water privatization" can mean many different
things in various contexts, 8 this Article treats the topic at a relatively
broad level: the private ownership, control, development, exploitation,
trade in, and use of water for private purpose or gain. This includes water
at its sources, such as groundwater or surface water in rivers, streams,
and lakes, or even as part of wetlands or coastal estuaries. It also includes
water being distributed to human users, such as public drinking water
supplies, industrial and commercial supplies of water, agricultural irri-
gation systems, and bottled water.
" Various commentators define the terms in different ways. E.g., KEN CONCA, GOVERNING
WATER: CoNTENTIous TRANSNATIONAL POLITICS AND GLOBAL INSTITUTION BUILDING 215-
16 (2006) (distinguishing between water privatization and water marketization); ERIC T.
FREYFOGLE, THE LAND WE SHARE: PRrVATE PROPERTY AND THE COMMON GOD157-201
(carefully analyzing privatization and markets separately); Aldo Davila & Andrew
Whitford, Water, Water Everywhere?: Legal Structures for the Contracting and Privati-
zation of Public Water Resources, 15 Mo. ENVTL. L. & POLY REV. 49,51 (2007) (distinguish-
ing between contracting and privatization). For other examples of scholarly analyses of
public water services privatization, private property interests in water, and commodi-
fication of water as being integrally related to one another, see Robert Glennon, Water
Scarcity, Marketing, and Privatization, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1873, 1898 (2005); David J. Hayes,
Privatization and Control of U.S. Water Supplies, NAT. RESOURCE & ENVr, Fall 2003, at
19, 19.
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In particular, this Article highlights three aspects of private con-
trol over water. The first is the privatization of public water systems and
drinking water supplies and infrastructure. The second is the legal treat-
ment of water as an object of private property rights. And the third is our
society's framing of water as a marketable consumer commodity.
A. Privatization of Public Water Services 9
1. Status and Trends
The United States is experiencing a controversial trend towards
privatization of public water services.2" The amount of all public water
services in the United States provided by privately-owned water suppli-
ers is relatively small.2' They serve about 15% of U.S. water customers
(measured in volume of water handled), take in about 14% of total water
revenues, and hold about 11% of all water system assets in the United
States, even though the number of such systems constitutes about 33%
of all community water systems.22 Nonetheless, private operation, con-
trol, or ownership of local water supply systems has increased dramati-
cally since the 1980s.23 The increased interest in privatizing public water
1 See generally Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Privatization of Public Water Services: The
States' Role in Ensuring Public Accountability, 32 PEPP. L. REV. 561 (2005).
21 See generally PETER H. GLEICK ET AL., THE NEW ECONOMY OF WATER: THE RISKS AND
BENEFITS OF GLOBALIZATION AND PRIVATIZATION OF FRESH WATER (Pacific Inst. Studies
in Dev., Env't & Sec. 2002); ROBIN A. JOHNSON ET AL., LONG-TERM CONTRACTING FOR
WATER AND WASTEWATER SERVICES(2002); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, PRIVATIZATION
OF WATER SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES: AN ASSESSMENT OF ISSUES AND EXPERIENCE
(2002); Isabelle Fauconnier, The Privatization of Residential Water Supply and Sanitation
Services: Social Equity Issue in the California and International Contexts, 13 BERKELEY
PLAN. J. 37 (1999); Robert Vitale, Privatizing Water Systems: A Primer, 24 FORDHAM INTL
L. J. 1382 (2001); Kathy Neal et al., Restructuring America's Water Industry: Comparing
Investor-Owned and Government Water Systems (Reason Found., Policy Study No. 200,
1996), available at http'//www.reason.org/filesOb4ab4led2lba3el6dbac550019e26ab.pdf;
Wolfgang Harrer, The Giants of Water: RWE, Vivendi, & Suez, EcOWORLD, Dec. 12,2002,
httpJ/www.ecoworld.org/Homearticles2.cfinMD--329 (describing the reasons behind water
privatization).
21 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 20, at 2-3, 14-15.
22 Id. at 3, 15.
" See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 20, at 3-5; David L. Correll, Water Industry Catches Wave
of Opportunity, UTIL. BUS., Mar. 30, 1999; John Maggs, The State Experience, 35 NAT'L
J. 2234, 2234-35 (2003); Marianne Lavelle et al., The Coming Water Crisis, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Aug. 12, 2002, at 22, 22-25; Jon Luoma, Water for Profit: Contamination,
Riots, Rate Increases, Scandals, MOTHER JONES, Nov. 1, 2002, at 34, 34-36; Mort
Rosenblum, Is Water a Human Right or a Commodity?,L.A. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2002, at A.3.
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services is an outgrowth of political forces and public policies favoring pri-
vatization of public services generally, and water resources specifically.24
A growing number of contracts to privatize public water services is an
indicator that privatization has become increasingly attractive to many
public water institutions." According to one report, in only a three year
period from 1997 to 2000, seventy cities entered into long-term contracts
with private entities to operate and maintain their local water supplies
or wastewater systems.2' A 2007 survey showed that nearly 600 cities
had contracts with private water companies in 43 states.27
State legal authority for public entities to privatize water systems
has aided the privatization trend. States have enacted statutes authoriz-
ing municipalities and other public entities to enter into contracts with
private entities to supply water to the public. Many states have statutes
expressly authorizing public entities to contract with private entities for
the long-term operation or lease of public water works facilities, or even to
sell these facilities to private buyers, in some cases with few to no signifi-
cant conditions to safeguard the public.2" On the other hand, some states
24See, e.g., DAVID F. LINOWES, PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON PRIVATIZATION, PRIVATIZATION:
TOWARD MORE EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT (1988); Donald G. Featherstun et al., State and
Local Privatization:An Evolving Process, 30 PUB. CONT. L.J. 643, 644-45 (2001); Maggs,
supra note 23, at 2234-35; Shirley L. Mays, Privatization of Municipal Services: A
Contagion in the Body Politic, 34 DuQ. L. REV. 41, 42-45 (1995); Cynthia DeLaughter,
Comment, Priming the Water Industry Pump, 37 HOus. L. REV. 1465, 1466 (2000).
25 SHINEY VARGHESE, PRIVATIZING U.S. WATER 1 (Institute for Agriculture and Trade
Policy 2007).
26 Johnson, supra note 20, at 4-5.
2 7 VARGHESE, supra note 25, at 2-3.
28 See MCQUILLIN MUN. CORP., § 10.35 (3d ed. 1997 & Supp. 2001) (referencing statutes in
Kentucky, New Jersey, Texas, and Utah); V. Woerner, Power of Municipality to Sell, Lease,
or Mortgage Public Utility Plant or Interest Therein, 61 A.L.R. 2d 595, § 3(b) (1999) (citing
cases where state statutes conferring power upon municipalities to sell public utilities
have been held constitutional); see also Cornell, supra note 23 (discussing trend towards
state authorization of water privatization); see, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 10061 (West
2004) (authority to lease, sell, or transfer municipally owned water service utilities); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 30-35-202 (2004) (power to sell public utilities and sell or lease real property);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-326 (2004) (providing procedures to the leasing and selling of water,
light, power, and gas plants); 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7-102(A)(c) (2004) (requiring com-
mission approval for transactions to assign, transfer, lease, mortgage, sell any of its fran-
chises, licenses, permits, plant, equipment, business, or other property); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 107.700-107.770 (West 2004) (authorizing privatization ofwater and wastewater
improvements); TEX. WATER CODEANN. §§ 13.511-13.515 (Vernon 2004) (grantingpowers
to privatize sewage treatment and disposal); UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-10d-4 (2004) (allowing
government projects for the private ownership or operation of water and wastewater
facilities and services).
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water privatization statutes are comprehensive and detailed, not only spec-
ifying what types of privatization are authorized, but also mandating spe-
cific standards, conditions, and procedures to govern local privatization
of municipal water services. An example is the New Jersey Water Supply
Public-Private Contracting Act.29 In other states, courts have historically
upheld the inherent power of cities to enter into contracts with private
firms concerning public utilities. A recent Pennsylvania case reflects the
trend of courts to allow sales, leases, and long-term contracts, even in the
absence of statutory authority, on the theory that water services are a pro-
prietary, not governmental, function of municipalities and therefore can
be transferred to private entities.3 0
Water privatization takes several different forms, ranging from:
1) outsourcing specific services of publicly owned water supply and service
systems, to 2) having private sector operation, maintenance, or even con-
struction of public owned water systems with agreed-upon returns to the
private companies for their services and investments, to 3) outright trans-
fer of ownership of public water systems to private.3'
2. Causes
Several conditions have contributed to the water privatization
trend. First, many municipalities have aging or obsolete water service
infrastructure that requires enormous investment to upgrade or replace.
Some municipalities and public entities have failed to make major invest-
ments during the life of aging facilities, often due to other demands for
public finance, the desire to keep water rates low, and limited legal and
financial capacity to engage in debt-financing.32 At the same time, all
" New Jersey Water Supply Contracting Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58:26-1 to 26-27 (West
2004).
o Boyle v. Mun. Auth. of Westmoreland County, 796 A.2d 389, 392-93 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2002).
31 For discussions of the types of privatization of municipal water services and systems,
see NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 20, at 56-80; Gleick, supra note 20, at 26-28;
Johnson, supra note 20, at 1-2, 11-13; Vitale, supra note 20, at 1386-90. Arrangements
short of ownership transfer include Operate-Maintain-Manage ("OMM") contracts, and
Design-Build-Operate ("DBO") contracts. An alternate hybrid arrangement is a Design-
Build-Own-Operate-Transfer ("DBOOT") contract, in which the private entity finances
and engages in the design, building, and operation of the facility as a private owner, and
then transfers it to the city at a particular time. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra
note 20, at 21.32 See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 20, at 3-4, 18-19; Ted Sherman, Liquid
Assets, THE STAR-LEDGER, Oct. 1, 2003, at 27; Varghese, supra note 25, at 4.
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suppliers of public drinking water have had to comply with increasingly
stringent federal requirements for drinking water quality under the Safe
Drinking Water Act.3 3 Furthermore, operational costs for public water
supply systems have increased with growing public demand for water,
decreasing supplies of readily available inexpensive water, and environ-
mental constraints on water exploitation. 34 Estimates put the infrastruc-
ture investment needed in the United States to be $140-250 billion in the
next 20-30 years.35 Many publicly-owned and publicly-operated water util-
ities, especially the small and medium sized ones (i.e., serving populations
of 50,000 or less), "lack the financial capacity and scale of operations to
make the imminent investments required without immediate, severe rate
increases for water service .... 3 6 In some cases, they simply do not have
the debt capacity to make such large capital improvements, regardless
of rate increases.37
Second, private water corporations have identified U.S. public
water systems as potentially profitable to own or operate.38 These are pri-
marily U.S. subsidiaries of the three major multinational water companies:
the French corporation Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux, which is now called Suez
Environment which owns United Water in the United States, and the two
German corporations RWE AG, which controls American Water Works
Company, and Siemens, which acquired US Filter Corps from French
Veolia Environment, and runs US Filter under the Siemens name.39 They
33 Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-523,88 Stat. 1660 (1974) (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 300f- 300j-26 (2006)), amended significantly by the Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594
(2002); see also NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL supra note 20, at 3,37,47-48; Vitale, supra
note 20, at 1382-84. See generally Cornell, supra note 23; Lavelle, supra note 23.
34 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 20, at 81-87.35 Id. at 3, 18.
3 8Arnold, supra note 19, at 571.
3 7Innovative Financing Techniques for Water Infrastructure Improvement: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. Fisheries, Wildlife, and Water of the S. Comm. on Env't and Pub. Works,
107th Cong. 62 (2001) (statement of Harold J. Gorman, Board Member, Association of
Metropolitan Water Agencies).
38 Arnold, supra note 19, at 571-73.
31 United Water, About US, http://www.unitedwater.com/company-overview.aspx (last
visited Apr. 1, 2009); Update 1 - American Water Works Files with U.S. SEC for IPO,
REUTERS, Aug. 27, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/governmentFilingsNews/idUSN
2720297920070827 (last visited Apr. 1, 2009); MSN Money, American Water Works Co.
Inc.: Ownership, http://moneycentral.msn.com/ownership?Holding=5%25+Ownership&
Symbol=AWK (last visited Apr. 1, 2009) (indicating that as of Dec. 31, 2008, an RWE AG
subsidiary owned 60.5% of American Water Works outstanding shares); Siemens to Buy
U.S. Filter Systems Services Businesses, FILTRATION INDUSTRY ANALYST, May 2004, at 1;
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have engaged in systematic marketing of their financial capacity to make
substantial capital investments in new or upgraded public water supply
infrastructure and to operate public water systems more efficiently than
public sector operators.4" Municipalities and other local water systems
have found privatization proposals to be attractive ways of meeting regu-
latory, performance, and capital improvement requirements that have
seemed beyond public sector capacity, and private water companies have
successfully bid to provide water services to a growing number of U.S.
cities of all sizes.4 In some cases, public officials have no other practical
options, but in other cases, public officials are seeking to avoid costly and
politically unpalatable choices.
Third, private water companies now can compete better with public
sector water system operators due to a 1997 change in the tax treatment of
interest on state and local bonds. Under Internal Revenue Service Revenue
Procedure 97-13, bonds financing public works that are subject to private
operation and maintenance contracts retain their tax exempt status, pro-
vided that the contracts do not exceed twenty years and that the contractor
not share in net profits, but instead chooses either to share cost savings or
share in revenue enhancements.4 2 For these type of privatization arrange-
ments, the I.R.S. rule eliminated a historical tax advantage of two to three
percentage points that public water systems had over private water sys-
tems.43 Also, private entities do not have to repay the federal government
in full for federal investments in public infrastructure projects subsequently
sold to private entities.'
Fourth, water privatization is a subset of a political and ideological
agenda to privatize many government functions, reducing the role of gov-
ernment and increasing the role of private market and private sector
providers of public services.45 Political leaders sympathetic to reducing
see also Sheila R. Cherry, Monopolies on the Local Water Front, INSIGHT ON NEws, Feb. 11,
2002, at 18, 18-19, 39; Sherman, supra note 32, at 27-28; Harrer, supra note 20.
4 See, e.g., United Water, Our Business, http://www.unitedwater.com/municipal-
partnerships.aspx (last visited Apr. 1, 2009); see also Arnold, supra note 19, at 572.
41 See NATIONALASSOCIATION OF WATER COMPANIES, PUBLIC WATER SUPPLY FACTS (1999)
(information sheet on file with author); UNITED WATER, PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS
(2003) (information sheet on file with author).
42 Rev. Proc. 97-13, 1997-1 C.B. 632.
43 See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 20, at 27-28.
4See Exec. Order No. 12,803, 57 Fed. Reg. 19063, 19063-64 (May 4, 1992).
45 See TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM (1991);
LINOWES, supra note 24; REGULATION AND THE REAGAN ERA: POLITICS, BUREAUCRACY AND
THE PUBLIC INTEREST (Roger E. Meiners & Bruce Yandle eds., 1989); David Haarmeyer,
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government, supporting private sector companies, or stretching limited
public funds have found justifications for privatizing public water systems
in policy reports and studies by private market advocates like the Reason
Foundation and the Cato Institute.46
Finally, privatization of public water supplies and infrastructure
is a global trend, appearing prominently in developing countries and cre-
ating intense conflicts over human rights, community vitality, ecological
sustainability, and national security.4 7 In 2000 alone, ninety-three
countries had municipalities that underwent some form of privatization.'
Financially-strapped developing nations are turning to large multinational
water corporations to invest in, build, and operate water systems that
will supply potable drinking water to large populations currently lacking
access to water.49 In addition, world economic institutions, such as the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, are pressuring devel-
oping nations to turn to privatized water systems, and even conditioning
loans to developing nations on water privatization. °
Worldwide, over 1 billion people, mostly in developing countries,
lack access to adequate supplies of safe drinking water for basic human
Privatizing Infrastructure: Options for Municipal Water Systems, (Reason Pub. Pol'y Inst.,
Report No. 151 1992), available at http://www.reason.org/files/4ae2b80350813fD66fbae6
baa3d98b7c.pdf
4 See FREDERIK SEGERFELDT, WATER FOR SALE: How BUSINESS AND THE MARKET CAN
RESOLVE THE WORLD'S WATER CRISIS (Cato Institute 2005); Johnson, supra note 20; Robin
Johnson & Adrian Moore, Opening the Floodgates: Why Water Privatization Will Continue
(Reason Pub. Pol'y Inst., Policy Brief 17, 2001), available at http://www.reason.org/pbriefl7
.html; Neal, supra note 20; Reason Foundation, Water Services, http://www.privatization
.org/database/policyissues/waterlocal.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2009); see also WATER
PARTNERSHIP COUNCIL, ESTABLISHING PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS FOR WATER AND
WASTEWATER SYSTEMS: A BLUEPRINT FOR SUCCESS (2003).47 See Jeffry S. Wade, Privatization and the Future.of Water Services, 20 FLA. J. INT'L. L.
179, 181, 198 (2008).
" Violeta Petrova, Note, At the Frontiers of the Rush for Blue Gold: Water Privatization
and the Human Right to Water, 31 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 577, 577 (2006).
49 See GLEICK, supra note 20.
50 See KEN CONcA, GOVERNINGWATER: CONTENTIOUS TRANSNATIONAL POLITIcS AND GLOBAL
INSTITUTION BUILDING 221-23 (2006); Jason Astle, Between the Market and the Commons:
Ensuring the Right to Water in Rural Communities, 33 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 585,
588-89 (2005); James Salzman, Thirst: A Short History of Drinking Water, 18 YALE J. L.
& HUMAN. 94,95-96 (2006); Timothy O'Neill, Note, Water and Freedom: The Privatization
of Water and Its Implications for Democracy and Human Rights in the Developing World,
17 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POLY 357, 358-59 (2006); Petrova, supra note 48 at 585-
86; Rachel Welch, Comment, And Not a Drop to Drink: Water Privatization, Pseudo-
Sovereignty, and the Female Burden, 15 TUL. J. INT'L COMP. L. 311, 313, 315-16 (2006).
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needs, and over 2 billion people lack access to sanitation services.5' As a
result, enormous amounts of time are spent, mostly by women, to seek
out and transport domestic drinking water to their homes daily.52 A 2003
World Health Organization report identified 2.2 million deaths worldwide,
mostly among children, due to lack of safe drinking water and sanitation,'
the third highest mortality cause in the developing world behind malnu-
trition and HIV/AIDS.' Governments of developing nations, however, typi-
cally lack the financial resources required to make the major investments
in water development, management, and distribution systems needed to
ensure safe water supplies.55
Large multinational water corporations have capital to invest in
water systems worldwide in exchange for ownership or control of these sys-
tems and the (estimated) substantial profits from these water ventures.56
These corporations have specialized in water development, management,
and distribution, seeing a globally unmet need that will be increasingly
profitable, and they aggressively seek out investment and ownership oppor-
tunities in water service systems worldwide. Vivendi (or Veolia Environ-
ment) operates in over 100 countries and provides water services to 110
million people, Suez operates in 130 countries and provides water services
to 115 million people; and RWE AG provides water services to over 70
million people.57 The combined revenue potential of these three dominant
multinational water corporations is close to $3 trillion."
51 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, GLOBAL WATER SUPPLY AND SANITATION ASSESSMENT
2000 REPORT 1 (2000), available at httpJ/www.who.int/water-sanitationhealth/monitoring/
jmp2000.pdf.
2 See Janet Neuman, Chop Wood, Carry Water: Cutting to the Heart of the World's Water
Woes, 23 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 203, 209-10 (2008); Welch, supra note 50, at 315-16.
53 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, THE RIGHT TO WATER 6 (2003), available at http://www
.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/6/who-ohchr.pdf.
' WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, THE WORLD HEALTH REPORT 2002: REDUCING RISKS,
PROMOTING HEALTHY LIFE 8-9 (2002), available at httpJ/www.who.int/whr/2002/en/whr02
_en.pdf.
55 See Petrova, supra note 48, at 581-82.
See O'Neill, supra note 50, at 359-60.
s Julio Godoy, The Center for Public Integrity, Water Barons, Water and Power: The
French Connection, http://projects.publicintegrity.orgwater/ (follow "Water and Power:
The French Connection" hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 2, 2009); see also Petrova, supra
note 48, at 578 n.9.
' Bill Marsden, The Center for Public Integrity, Water Barons, Cholera and the Age of
Water Barons, http://projects.publicintegrity.org/water/ (follow "Cholera and the Age of
Water Barons" hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 2, 2009).
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Water privatization in the developing world has been met-with
public opposition and conflict, as opponents argue that water is a human
right and that global corporations are exploiting the needs of the world's
poor for profit. 9 In Cochabamba, Bolivia, the government, under pressure
from the World Bank, granted a 40-year concession to a private consor-
tium, headed by the Bechtel Corporation, to operate the municipal water
system.6" The municipal water system had failed to meet local need, with
over forty percent of the area residents lacking access to a water supply
network.6' After only four months, water prices had increased as much
as 400% and workers were spending over one-quarter of their income on
water." The government cancelled the contract after anti-privatization
protests of 15,000 to 20,000 people from a diverse cross-section of Bolivian
society resulted in hundreds of injuries, $20 million in property damage,
and the death of a 17-year-old boy from confrontations between the pro-
testers and police.6" The consortium filed a $25 million claim against
Bolivia, but eventually dropped it in the face of worldwide public
outrage.64 The controversy also produced the Cochabamba Declaration, a
nonbinding assertion that "[w] ater is a fundamental human right and a
public trust to be guarded by all levels of government, therefore, it should
not be commodified, privatized or traded for commercial purposes. " 65
Though tensions between water privatization and human rights
in developing countries cause great unrest, Canada and the United States
are not immune to conflict.66 Private-market advocates declare that the
privatization of water services in the U.S. will grow,67 but substantial
" See Petrova, supra note 48, at 592-93.
60 For descriptions of the Cochabamba water privatization dispute, see Salzman, supra
note 50, at 94-96; Astle, supra note 50, at 589-90; O'Neill, supra note 50, at 361-71; Welch,
supra note 50, at 316-19.
61 O'Neill, supra note 50, at 363.
62 Id. at 367-68.
6Id. at 361, 368, 370.
"Welch, supra note 50, at 317.6 Cochabamba Declaration, Dec. 8,2000, available at http-//www.nadir.org/nadir/initiativ/
agp/free/imf/bolivia/cochabamba.htm#declaration.
66 See CONCA, supra note 50, at 239-41; Glennon, supra note 18, at 1890-96; Melissa
Kwaterski Scanlan, Protecting the Public Trust and Human Rights in the Great Lakes,
2006 MICH. ST. L. REv. 1333, 1339-45(2006); Patricia Wouters, A New Generation of Local
Water Leaders, 18 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POLY 513, 515 (2007).
67 See, e.g., Johnson & Moore, supra note 46; see also WATER PARTNERSHIP COUNCIL,
ESTABLISHING PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS FOR WATER AND WASTEWATER SYSTEMS: A
BLUEPRINT FOR SUCCESS (2003); Varghese, supra note 25, at 3 (reporting that two water
companies are seeking to acquire between twenty and thirty public water systems in the
U.S. per year).
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opposition has arisen from local citizens' groups, environmental groups,
and others.68
3. Conflicts and Failures
The privatization trend in the U.S. has encountered obstacles in
the form of conflicts over privatization and notable failures ofprivatization
arrangements. Some communities have terminated contracts or bought
out private water suppliers due to dissatisfaction. The most visible of these
failed privatization efforts was Atlanta's termination of its twenty-year
municipal water system operation contract with United Water, a U.S.
subsidiary of Suez Lyonnaise, in 2003.69 Atlanta entered into the contract
in 1999 due to the inefficiencies and inadequacies of its public sector water
operations, as well as high infrastructure-related costs.7" The parties,
however, rushed through the bidding and approval process, failed to gather
sufficient information, and did not negotiate carefully.7 Moreover, United
ran the Atlanta system poorly, resulting in extensive complaints and
widespread public and municipal regret over the privatization decision.72
It underbid the highly competitive contract to operate, maintain, and
upgrade Atlanta's aging water infrastructure, but blamed the city for
" See, e.g., Harrer, supra note 20; Privatization of Water and Wastewater Services 1
(Texas Living Waters Project, Issue Paper No. 6, 2002), available at http://www.texas
watermatters.com/pdfs/water-planning-committee6.pdf.
69 For the history of Atlanta's woes with United Water, see D.L. Bennett, Auction No
Winner for City Bids High on United Water Equipment, ATLANTAJ.-CONST., Aug. 7,2003,
at 3; D.L. Bennett, Water Utility Equipment to Go on Auction Block, Atlanta to Bid on
Backhoes, Trucks, Chairs, ATLANTA J.-CONST., July 30, 2003, at B4; Colin Campbell,
There's No Pot of Gold in More Privatization, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Nov. 2, 2003, at E2;
Martha Carr, Water Woes in Atlanta a Cautionary Tale for N.O., Privatizing Doable, Not
Cure-All, City Told, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PIcAYUNE, June 29, 2003, at 1; Tedra DeSue,
Atlantans Beg City Council Not to Impose Huge Water Rate Hike, BOND BUYER, Dec. 2,
2003, at 36; Tedra DeSue, Water Rates May Rise to Cover Debt, Atlanta Mayor Warns,
BOND BUYER, Oct. 16, 2003, at 4; Milo Ippolito, Atlanta Takes Over Water System, Huge
Utility With Aging Pipes Back Under City Control, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Apr. 30, 2003, at
B5; Frank Koller, No Silver Bullet, Water Privatization in Atlanta, Georgia-A Cautionary
Tale, CBC NEWS, Feb. 5,2003, httpv/www.cbc.ca/news/features/water/atlanta.html; Lavelle,
supra note 23; Sherman, supra note 32; Water Remuncipalisation Tracker, Atlanta, httpJ/
www.remunicipalisation.org/cases#Atlanta (last visited Apr. 5,2009); The City ofAtlanta
and United Water, Inc.: A Case Study in Privatization (Dec. 11, 2006), http://docs.google
.comNiew?docid=ddnrwjjv_7f5msvf (last visited Apr. 5, 2009).
70 Carr, supra note 69, at 1.
71 Maggs, supra note 23, at 2235-37.
72 Carr, supra note 69, at 1.
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allegedly failing to fully disclose the condition of its infrastructure. 73 As
United Water cut jobs and training to reduce expenses, it developed
backlogs of thousands of work orders and delivered poor quality of water,
often with inadequate pressure.74 As a result, water ran orange to brown
for many customers, tinting clothes laundered in it and hair washed in
it, 75 and United Water had to issue numerous "boil water" orders because
low pressure or insufficient water treatment made the water unsafe to
drink, even though some customers said that they did not receive notices
until one to two days after the water became unsafe.7" In one example,
United did not address a broken main gushing water into the street and
washing away pavement during a severe drought for ten days, even
though a customer notified United repeatedly.77 In addition, inefficiencies
led to waste, such as failure to bill customers properly, which resulted in
millions of dollars of lost revenues to the City of Atlanta. After city
officials and United Water management agreed to terminate the contract
after only four years, the city resumed operation of its water system
under a new structure, making infrastructure upgrades, hiring new staff,
and introducing new customer service processes.79
Other communities have also terminated privatization arrange-
ments. In 2005, halfway through a five-year water system operation con-
tract with the City of Laredo, Texas, United Water sought to terminate
the contract because the costs of operating the system were higher than
they had anticipated in negotiating the contract.8 " The City of Laredo re-
took control of the system only after United agreed to the City's demands
to pay the City $3 million in exit fees, leaving the City with the obligation
7 Koller, supra note 69.
7' Carr, supra note 69, at 1.
75Koller, supra note 69; see also Massachusetts Department ofEnvironmental Protection,
Water, Wastewater, & Wetlands, Color, Taste, and Odor: What You Should Know, http://
www.mass.gov/dep/water/drinking/color.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2009).
76 Carr, supra note 69, at 1; Koller supra note 69.
7' Koller, supra note 69.
78 GLOBAL HEALTH WATCH 2005-2006: AN ALTERNATIvE WORLD HEALTH REPORT 219 (Zed
Books 2005), available at http://www.ghwatch.org/2005report/ghw.pdf.
' The Center for Public Integrity, The Water Barons, Water Privatization Becomes a
Signature Issue in Atlanta, http://projects.publicintegrity.org/water/report.aspx?aid=55
(last visited Apr. 5, 2009).
80 FOOD AND WATER WATCH, FAULTY PIPES: WHY PUBLIC FUNDING-NOT PRIVATIZATION-IS
THE ANSWER FOR U.S. WATER SYSTEMS 19 (2006), available at http://www.win-water.org/
reports/2006-06faulty-pipes.pdf; PUBLIC CITIZEN, WAVES OF REGRET 7-8 (2005), available
at http'//www.citizen.org/documents/waves.pdf.
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to address repair and maintenance needs."' Even though RWE and its
subsidiary American Water successfully spent at least $2.71 million to
defeat a Lexington, Kentucky, voter initiative to require the city to re-
take its water system by eminent domain,82 residents of the City of Felton,
California, voted to borrow $11 million to repurchase their water system
from Cal-Am, a subsidiary of RWE, following increasing water rates, de-
teriorating service, and poor management, despite substantial amounts
spent by RWE attempting to defeat the vote.83 In 2004, OMI/CH2M Hill
canceled its contract with East Cleveland, Ohio because OMI failed to
generate its projected water and sewer revenues that the city needed to
pay the monthly operating fee to OMI. 4 In addition, a federal indictment
unsealed in 2005 charged a consultant working for OMI with bribing the
then-Mayor of East Cleveland to retain OMI's contract with the city.' The
bribery charge is, sadly enough, not surprising. Water privatization bid
processes in Birmingham, Atlanta, and New Orleans have also been tainted
by charges that political favors were exchanged for favorable treatment
of private companies' bids, according to a National Academy of Sciences
National Research Council report.86
In other communities, public opposition has defeated proposed
privatization arrangements. Like Atlanta, Stockton, California, may be a
harbinger of growing conflicts over water privatization in the United States.
In 2003, Stockton city officials had approved a highly controversial $600
million contract with OMI/Thames to operate the city's water and sewer
systems, shortly before voters passed a ballot initiative to require any new
water privatization contracts be submitted to the voters.87
81 See FOOD AND WATER WATCH, supra note 80, at 19.
82 Food and Water Watch, Water: Lexington, KY, http://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/
water/private-vs-public/usa/lexington-ky (last visited Apr. 5, 2009).
s' See Mike Esterl, U.S. Water Privatizations Fail to Pan Out, WALL ST. J., June 26,2006.
84 See Mike Hudson, Two Deal Brokers With Dirty Hands Manipulated Ohio Water
Contracts, L.A. TIMES, May 29, 2006, at 6.
85 Id.
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 20, at 26.
87 Water Industry News, "Concerned Citizens" Ask Courts to Stop Stockton OMI-Thames
Deal, http'/www.waterindustry.org/New%2OProjects/stockton-ca-19.htm (last visited Feb. 23,
2009). For details on the Stockton water privatization controversy, see Concerned Citizens
Coalition v. City of Stockton, Case No. CV 020397, ruling on pet. for mandamus (Cal.
Super. Ct. Oct. 17, 2003), 2003 WL 25777610; GARY H. WOLFF, INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF
THE PROPOSED STOCKTON WATER PRIVATIZATION (Pacific Inst. for Studies in Dev., Env't
& Sec. 2003), available at httpJ/www.pacinst.org/topics/water-and-sustainability/water
-privatization/stockton/stockton-privatization review.pdf; Symposium, Private Sector
Participation in Water Services: Through the Lens of Stockton, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1323,
1328-31 (2006).
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However, the opponents' lawsuit against the city over its failure to
conduct an environmental impact analysis of the privatization arrange-
ment, although hard fought by the city and OMI, proved to be the critical
factor in killing the deal." OMI spent millions unsuccessfully to defeat
the anti-privatization initiative and to defend the lawsuit brought by oppo-
nents under the California Environmental Quality Act ("CEQA). 89 After
independent analyses showed that the contract was based on underesti-
mated inflation figures, overestimated energy expenditures, and overstated
capital cost savings, courts determined that CEQA required the city to
engage in thorough environmental impact analyses before approving the
contract.90 At that point, the city and OMI decided to terminate the ar-
rangement, and the city retook control of its water system in March 2008."'
In 2002, the New Orleans Water and Sewerage Board rejected a
proposal to privatize its water and sewer system under strong pressure
from citizen groups concerned about service and cost to low-income city
residents, impact on city employees, compromise of environmental stan-
dards, and other public-impact issues.92 After political efforts to revive the
water privatization process, the City finally decided in 2004 to reject privat-
izing a combined water/wastewater operation, determining that bids by
United Water and Veolia Water were inadequate and expressing concern
that Veolia's operation of the city's wastewater system at the time was
marred by numerous environmental violations, mechanical failures, and
lack of regard for the maintenance and long-term needs of the system.93
Likewise, Orange County (California) Local Agency Formation Commission
("LAFCO") voted to reject a proposal to privatize the Santa Margarita
Water District in the face of strong opposition by residential customers
concerned about insufficient oversight by the California Public Utilities
Commission and the potential for poorer service for higher costs.' More-
over, Phoenix, Arizona's decision to privatize part of its water system fell
Editorial, Stockton's Thirst Gets Quenched, SAN FRANCIScO CHRON., July 30, 2007, at B6.
See Environmental News Service, Stockton Obeys Court Ruling, Ends Water
Privatization, httpJ/www.ens-newswire.com/ens/jul2007/2007-07-20-09.asp#anchor3 (last
visited Apr. 5, 2009).
o Concerned Citizens Coal., 2003 WL 25777610; WOLFF, supra note 87, at 3.
91 See Environmental News Service, supra note 89.
92 PUBLIC CITIZEN, THE BIG GREEDY 1-2 (2001), available at httpJ/www.citizen.org/
documents/BigGreedy_(PDF).pdf; Martha Carr, Forum Speakers Oppose Privatizing
S&WB: Local Control Called Important, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, July 23, 2003,
at 01.
93See PUBLIC CITIZEN, VEOLIA ENVIRONMENT: A CORPORATE PROFILE 4-5 (2005), available
at httpJ/www.citizen.orgdocuments/Vivendi-USFilter.pdf.
' See Fauconnier, supra note 20, at 57-59.
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apart when its top bidder, Earth Tech, failed to obtain a letter from a bank
guaranteeing a $20 million line of credit, because its parent company, the
Bermuda-based Tyco International, had been looted by former top execu-
tives for up to $600 million.95
Finally, communities have experienced performance problems with
private water companies owning or operating their local systems. For
example, federal authorities raided a facility operated by OMI in Santa
Paula, California in 2003 because investigators discovered that OMI was
violating terms of its discharge permit and had apparently filed false
water-quality reports.' In addition, private water companies' attempts to
sell or develop public watershed lands in Connecticut and New Jersey were
met with public opposition and government restrictions on sales and devel-
opment.97 A Connecticut state statute prohibiting sales of watershed lands
to private parties was upheld by federal courts. 98 However, New Jersey has
also experienced problems with private transfers of municipal water sup-
plies. A 2004 audit found that United Water diverted $1.2 million worth
of water between 2000 and 2003 without paying the Jersey City Municipal
Utilities Authority." This water was diverted from municipal reservoirs
and shipped to other communities that are also customers of the system.' 0
Even the primary premise of water privatization-that it produces
more efficient water system operations than the public sector can provide-
is questionable. Economic analyses of only the operating efficiencies of
privately operated systems versus publicly operated systems show mixed
results, with four studies finding that private utilities are more efficient,
five studies finding that public utilities are more efficient, and three studies
finding no differences in efficiencies between private and public water
utilities.' In addition, private water companies have little incentive to
9 See Tom Zoellner, Privatizing Water Hits Roadblock; Firm's Finances Put Phoenix Deal
atRisk,ARIZ. REPUBLIC, June 9,2003, at 1B; Tom Zoellner, Water Plant Verdict Due Today;
Phoenix Council Will Decide on Privatizing Supply, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, July 3, 2003, at 4B.
96 PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 80, at 10; News Release, County of Ventura District
Attorney (June 29, 2006), available at http'//da.countyofventura.org/06-051.htm.
97 See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCI, supra note 20, at 104-105; Matthew Futterman,
Watershed's Development Rekindles Fight, STAR-LEDGER, Feb. 4, 1999, at 17; Vitale, supra
note 20, at 1392.
98 See Bridgeport Hydraulic Co. v. Council on Water Co. Lands of State of Conn., 453 F.
Supp 942, 946-48 (D. Conn. 1977).
9 PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 80, at 8-9.
100 See id.
101 Steven Renzetti & Diane Dupont, The Relationship Between the Ownership and
Performance of Municipal Water Utilities, in FROM CONFLICT TO CO-OPERATION IN
INTERNATIONAL WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 141-
46 (Saskia Castelein ed., 2002).
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invest in public water systems' improvements or maintenance activities
that will produce benefits beyond the end of the privatization contract's
term.1O2 As a result, privatization may not solve the long-term upgrade
and maintenance problems of public entities, which may receive their sys-
tems back from private operators in surprisingly serious need of immedi-
ate public investment. Furthermore, motivated by cost reduction goals,
private water companies may fail to consider impacts on the natural envi-
ronment, including watershed ecosystem services, instream flows, and
aquifer health, when seeking inexpensive sources of water, shifting those
environmental costs to society as a whole. °3
B. Private Property Rights in Water
Beyond private ownership and control of public water supply sys-
tems, privatization is also about the recurring and relentless efforts in
the United States to treat interests in water as private property rights,
akin to private ownership of land. Water is different than other objects
of private ownership and rights, and as such, it has always had both strong
public characteristics and strong private characteristics. 104 Therefore, the
legal system's treatment of water as a private property right has been more
about a reiterative tension than about a linear trend.
Nonetheless, five contemporary aspects of the public-private tension
over water are worth special note.
102 See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 20, at 87, 102-103.
103 See Gleick, supra note 20, at 37-38; William Booth, Liquid Assets: Thirsty States
Turning to New Water Sources, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 15, 2002, at A3; Cherry, supra note
39, at 18-19. Indeed, California-American Water Co. was found guilty of illegally pumping
water from an underground river connected to the Carmel River, causing harm to fish
and riparian habitat. Mary Ann Milbourn, Water Company Taps River Source Illegally,
ORANGE COUNTY REG., July 8, 1995, at B04.
104 See ROBERT W. ADLER, RESTORING COLORADO RIVER ECOSYSTEMS: ATROUBLED SENSE
OF IMMENSITY 199 (2007); ERIC FREYFOGLE, BOUNDED PEOPLE, BOUNDLESS LANDS:
ENVISIONING A NEW LAND ETHIC 145 (1998); ERIC FREYFOGLE, WHY CONSERVATION IS
FAILING AND How IT CAN REGAIN GROUND 189 (2006); DAVID M. GILLILAN & THOMAS C.
BROWN, INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTION: SEEKING A BALANCE IN WESTER WATER USE 37
(1997); Joseph W. Dellapenna, Adapting Riparian Rights to the Twenty-First Century,
106 W. VA. L. REV. 539,545-54 (2004); David H. Getches, Constraints of Law and Policy
on the Management of Western Water, in WATER AND CLIMATE IN THE WESTERN UNITED
STATES 183-233 (William M. Lewis ed., 2003); A. Dan Tarlock, Water Law Reform in West
Virginia: The Broader Context, 106 W. VA. L. REV. 495,527-30 (2004); Sandra B. Zellmer
& Jessica Harder, Unbundling Property in Water, 59 ALA. L. REV. 679,691-99 (2008).
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First, and most fundamentally, public rights and interests in water
may be a theoretical starting point from which private rights and interests
in water emerge, but as a practical matter, private rights in water have
primacy, subject to a few key public interest limitations. Several doctrines
define the public interests in water. The "state ownership doctrine" holds
that ownership of navigable waters and their submerged lands passed
from the federal government into state ownership upon the state's admis-
sion to the Union." 5 The "public trust doctrine" limits the ability to of the
state government to convey navigable waters and their submerged lands
if such conveyances would be contrary to the public's equitable interest in
these resources for navigation, fishing, recreation, and possibly ecological
value."° The "federal navigation servitude" allows the federal government
to limit private uses of navigable waters and adjacent lands if they would
interfere with the federal government's interest in navigation and the
waters as channels of interstate commerce. °7 Government development
and management of large-scale water systems, such as dams, reservoirs,
and water distribution systems also serves as a doctrinal underpinning.0"
Other doctrines include a variety of statutory and regulatory systems
requiring water permits or registration in order to perfect rights in water
withdrawals and usage,0 9 regulating rates, service areas, and standards
105 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 537.110 (West 2008); see W. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-3-3 (West 2009);
see also Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11-26 (1894); Bamford v. Upper Republican
Natural Res. Dist., 512 N.W.2d 642, 649, 651 (Neb. 1994) (declaring state ownership of
groundwater); Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, Lucas's Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of
Background Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321,350
nn.192-93 (2005). But see Tarlock, supra note 104, at 529-30 (contending that the state
ownership doctrine was a legal fiction that facilitated state authority to regulate essentially
private rights in water).
" See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469,482 (1988); Illinois Cent. R.R.
Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 436-37 (1892); Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658
P.2d 709, 712 (Cal. 1983); In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 501 n.106
(Haw. 2000) (declaring groundwater subject to the public trust); Cinque Bambini P'ship
v. Mississippi, 491 So. 2d 508,519 (Miss. 1986); United Plainsmen Ass'n v. North Dakota
State Water Conservation Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976). See generally Zellmer
& Harder, supra note 104, at 691-99.
107 See United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121,122-23 (1967); United States v. Willow River
Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 507 (1945); Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269, 271-73
(1897); Palm Beach Isles Assoc. v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 657, 686 (2003); Martha
Haber, Note, The Navigation Servitude and the Fifth Amendment, 26 WAYNE L. REV.
1505, 1505-06, 1508 (1980).
108 See David J. Hayes, Connecting Population Growth and Water Supply: Strangers No
Longer, [2008] 38 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10596, at 10596; Daniel McCool, The
River Commons: A New Era in U.S. Water Policy, 83 TEx. L. REV. 1903, 1903 (2005).
'o
8 See Nekoosa-Edwards Paper Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 99 N.W.2d 821, 825-28 (Wis.
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for supplying water to the public,"' protecting surface water conditions
and wetlands,"' restricting discharges into surface waters,"2 preventing
and imposing liability for contamination of groundwater," 3 guaranteeing
minimum instream flows,". integrating management of groundwater
and surface water,"5 evaluating the environmental impacts of water
projects,"' imposing conservation policies,"7 and subjecting new water
1959) (upholding the statutory authority of the Wisconsin Public Service Commission to
regulate common-law riparian rights to the use ofnonsurplus water in a navigable stream);
JOSEPH L. SAXET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES: CASES AND MATERIALS 101-
18, 215-47 (4th ed. 2006); A. DAN TARLOCK ET AL., WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: A
CASEBOOK IN LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY, 275-387 (5th ed. 2002); A. DAN TARLOCK, BOTTLED
WATER: LEGAL ASPECTS OF GROUNDWATER EXTRACTION 10-11 (2004) (describing statutory
reforms to control groundwater withdrawals); Dellapenna, supra note 104, at 583-86
(outlining regulated riparianism adopted by eighteen states).
11 See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 20, at 91-99 (describing the variety
of regulations applicable to public water supplies).
... See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2006) (regulating the "discharged
of dredged or fill material" into wetlands and requiring a permit for any such discharge);
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 132-33 (1985) (upholding
federal restrictions on the development of wetlands under Clean Water Act § 404); A. Dan
Tarlock, Putting Rivers Back in the Landscape: The Revival of Watershed Management
in the United States, 14 HASTINGS W. Nw. J. ENvTL. L. & POLY 1059, 1078-80 (2008)
(describing water quality, wetlands, and endangered species protections under the federal
statute as "regulatory water rights"); see also Fred P. Bosselman, Limitations Inherent
in the Title to Wetlands at Common Law, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 247, 275-76 (1996) (giving
the history of wetland ownership in England prior to and during Norman times).1 2 See Clean Water Act §§ 301 & 402, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311 & 1342 (2006).
11' See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA) of 1980,42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2006); Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921 et seq. (2006); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f
et seq. (2006); Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1188 (6th Cir. 1988).
114 See, e.g., CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §§ 5937 & 5946 (West 2008); CAL. WATER CODE
§§ 1243, 1243.5, 1257.5, & 1258 (West 2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-1501 (2008). See
generally PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Dept. of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700
(1994); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Arizona Dept. of Water Res., 118 P.3d 1110 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2005); Hubbard v. State of Washington, 936 P.2d 27 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997); DAVID M.
GILLILAN & THOMAS C. BROWN, INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTION: SEEKING A BALANCE IN
WESTERN WATER USE (1997); Reed D. Benson, Rivers to Live By: Can Western Water Law
Help Communities Embrace Their Streams?, 27 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 1, 10-14
(2007); George William Sherk, Meetings of Waters: The Conceptual Confluence of Water
Law in Eastern & Western States, 5 NAT. RESOURCES & ENv T 3-5, 47 (1991).
'15 See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-656 (LexisNexis 2008); SAXETAL., supra note 109,
at 137, 454-68; TARLOCK, supra note 109, at 564-67.
11 See, e.g., Stempel v. Dept. of Water Res., 508 P.2d 166, 171 (Wash. 1973) (en banc)
(environmental impacts ofproposed water diversion permit and fundamental state policy
of an "ecological ethic" had to be considered in public welfare review of permit application);
Central Delta Water Agency v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d 898, 914
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rights or transbasin transfers of waters to public interest review."' Even
common law doctrines recognizing private property rights in water con-
tain inherent limits, such as the correlative nature of water rights that
riparian landowners share along a water body,"9 and prior appropriation
doctrine prohibitions on waste and speculation in water. 120 Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., articulated a particularly strong formulation of the
public nature of water:
[Flew public interests are more obvious, indisputable, and
independent of particular theory than the interest of the
public of a state to maintain the rivers that are wholly with-
in it substantially undiminished, except by such drafts upon
them as the guardian of the public welfare may permit for
the purpose of turning them to a more perfect use.
121
Nonetheless, all of these public interests in water actually operate
in practice as a patchwork of partial and partially effective constraints
on private rights in water. Policy makers, regulators, water institutions,
market participants, and the public take private property rights in water
as a given, subject to certain public limits, instead of starting with the
(Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
.17 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-732 (2007); TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 16.05 1(a) (Vernon
2008); Sherk, supra note 114, at 47-48.
118 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-203A(5)(e) (authorizing the director of the department
of water resources to reject any application for a water appropriation permit if it "will
conflict with the local public interest"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-289 (2008) (enumerating
factors for director of department of natural resources to consider in determining whether
public interest requires limiting water rights); UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-8 (2008) (directing
state engineer to reject or limit appropriations of water that would be detrimental to the
public welfare); GILLILAN & BROWN, supra note 104, at 37; Sherk, supra note 114, at 5.
119 See, e.g., Harris v. Brooks, 283 S.W.2d 129, 133-34 (Ark. 1955); Mason v. Hoyle, 14 A.
786, 788-97 (Conn. 1888); Dellapenna, supra note 104, at 556; see also Lindsley v. Natural
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911) (upholding government authority to protect correlative
rights of multiple holders of interests in groundwater).
120 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(3) (2008); Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay-
Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 45 P.2d 972,976 (Cal. 1935); State Dep't of Ecology v. Grimes,
852 P.2d 1044, 1053 (Wash. 1993); Janet Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture:
The Inefficient Search for Efficiency in Western Water Use, 28 ENVTL. L. 919, 928-33,946-
60, 978-95 (1998); Sandra Zellmer, The Anti-Speculation Doctrine and Its Implications
for Collaborative Water Management, NEV. L.J. (forthcoming 2009), available at http'/
ssrn.com/abstract=1121961.
121 Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 356 (1908).
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premise that all water is public property, subject to certain recognized
private interests.
122
Second, constitutional protections of private property rights under
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment'23 have made the growing reg-
ulatory protections of waters, wetlands, and watershed-supporting lands
costly to regulatory agencies when they limit the exercise of private prop-
erty rights on environmentally sensitive lands and waters. For example,
some federal courts have treated water rights as vested private property
rights for which the government must compensate the rights-holders when
government regulations protecting critical and sensitive ecological re-
sources limit the exercise of those private water rights.'24 In addition, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the state could not extinguish unex-
ercised riparian water rights in its attempt to unify its hybrid water rights
system under the prior appropriation doctrine without compensating
riparian landowners.125 Several cases have required the government to
compensate landowners who were not allowed to build on wetlands. 26
Even though water rights are usufructuary rights-rights to use-and
not possessory or title ownership rights127 and even though there are
numerous counter-examples where courts have held that restrictions on
water rights and the development of water-sensitive lands are not tak-
ings, 21 the private property rights movement seeks to treat water rights
122 See, e.g., GILLILAN & BROWN, supra note 104, at 37; Getches, supra note 104, at 186;
Glennon, supra note 18, at 1898; Hayes, supra note 18, at 19-22; Joseph L. Sax, Rights
that "Inhere in the Title Itself": The Impact of the Lucas Case on Western Water Law, 26
Loy. L. A. L. REv. 943, 945 (1993); Tarlock, supra note 104, at 527-30. For example, the
Wyoming Constitution provides that no private water appropriation right may be denied
.except when such denial is demanded by the public interests." WYo. CONST. art. VIII, §3.
123 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
124 See Fallini v. Hodel, 725 F. Supp. 1113 (D. Nev. 1989); Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v.
United States, 543 Fed. Cl. 1276 (2008); Hage v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 147 (1996),
51 Fed. Cl. 570 (2002); Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States., 49 Fed.
Cl. 313 (2001).
125 See Franco-American Charolaise, Ltd. v. Okla. Water Res. Bd., 855 P.2d 568, 582
(Okla. 1990).
12 See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Fla. Rock
Indus. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Bowles v. United States, 31 Fed.
Cl. 37 (1994); Friedenberg v. N.Y. Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 767 N.Y.S.2d 451 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2003).
127 See ADLER, supra note 104, at 199; FREYFOGLE (2006), supra note 104, at 189;
FREYFOGLE (1998), supra note 104, at 145; Zellmer & Harder, supra note 104, at 691-99;
Glennon, supra note 18, at 1898.
'" See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (leading to a state court
remand in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, No. WM 88-0297, 2005 WL 1645974 (R.I. Super.
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like land ownership rights. 2 9 These advocates are using takings litiga-
tion either to force government regulators to abandon restrictions on water
and land use or to force government to pay them substantial sums when
the ecological or natural conditions of waters and watersheds inhibit prof-
itable consumptive use of those resources. 30
Third, groundwater has become a target for exploitation and pump-
ing by private water bottling companies to meet high consumer demand
for bottled water. The bottled water industry generates $35 billion per
year.'3 ' In the United States, the consumption of bottled water has in-
creased by between eight and twenty percent per year since 1992.132 The
combination of consumer demand and profit potential has led to large
groundwater withdrawals by water bottling companies, which in turn has
generated fierce community opposition over the ecological and commu-
nity harms of such substantial withdrawals, particularly in Wisconsin,
Michigan, Texas, and Florida.'33 This trend has been facilitated by a vari-
ety of common law rules governing rights to extract groundwater-the
so-called English rule of absolute ownership, the American or reasonable
use rule, the Restatement of Torts § 858 (also a reasonable use rule),
correlative rights, and prior appropriation-and also by judicial treat-
ment of groundwater as an article of interstate commerce.' Large-scale
extraction of groundwater for bottled water contributes to over-pumping
of aquifers, resulting in depletion of the aquifer, increased contamina-
tion, salt water intrusion in coastal areas, harm to surface water systems
connected to groundwater, interference with biological and hydrologic
July 5,2005)); United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945); New Jersey
v. New York, 283 U.S. 366 (1931); Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349
(1908); Cooley v. United States, 324 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Good v. United States,
189 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Forest Props, Inc. v. United States, 177 F.3d 1360 (Fed.
Cir. 1999); Palm Beach Isles Assoc. v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 657 (2003); R & Y, Inc.
v. Anchorage, 34 P.3d 289 (Alaska 2001); Gove v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 831 N.E.2d 865
(Mass. 2005); Spear T. Ranch Inc. v. Knaub, 691 N.W.2d 116 (Neb. 2005); McQueen v.
S.C. Coastal Council, 580 S.E.2d 116 (S.C. 2003); Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d
761 (Wis. 1972).
129 See Hage v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 147 (1996); see also Eric T. Freyfogle, Water
Rights and the Common Wealth, 26 ENVTL. L. 27, 31 (1996) (critiquing the framing of
water as subject to private property rights akin to land rights).
130 See The Pacific Legal Foundation, Property Rights Litigation, http'//community
.pacificlegal.orgfPage.aspx?pid=269 (last visited Apr. 7, 2009).
31 Scanlan, supra note 66, at 1341 (citing TONY CLARKE, INSIDE THE BOTTLE: AN EXPOSE
OF THE BOTTLED WATER INDUSTRY 9 (2005)).
132 Tarlock, supra note 109, at 1.
See id. at 2; see also Scanlan, supra note 66, at 1341-42.
See Tarlock, supra note 109, at 8-10.
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processes, and social harm to local communities. 135 However, an increasing
number of common law principles, statutory reforms, and regulatory and
management systems, particularly at the state level, are attempting to
limit private exploitation of groundwater in order to protect the public's
interest in these resources.'36
Fourth, states have struggled to develop doctrines and policies to
protect the minimum instream flows necessary for the ecological and hydro-
logical integrity of flowing waters. 3 ' The movement to protect instream
flows has had to work against a political, economic, cultural, and some-
times legal presumption that the entirety of surface waters are potentially
subject to private appropriation and use. 3
Finally, increasing water scarcity, stress on watersheds, and com-
petition for water have prompted growing pressures for clear water quan-
tification and scarcity management rules, as well as private and public
markets in water rights and supplies.'39 The conditions in most states-for
a long time in the West but even more so now, and also now for the first
time in the East-are characterized by growing demand for water and de-
creasing supply of available water for human consumption. 4 The demand
growth is a result of increases in population, land development sprawl,
and consumption patterns.'4 ' Supplies have decreased as groundwater
levels have dropped from over-pumping, streams have dried up, waters
have become contaminated, and climate changes have produced drought
conditions, sometimes followed by flooding that has eroded surface water
15 Id. at 2-3.
136 See id. at 5-7, 10-11; see also Christine A. Klein & Ling-Yee Huang, Cultural Norms
as a Source of Law: The Example of Bottled Water, 30 CARDozO L. REV. 507,507-08 (2008)
(identifying water law principles of reasonable use, beneficial use, preferred uses, and the
public interest as means of mediating between a culture of bottled water adherents and
a culture of bottled water opponents).
137 See supra note 114.
138 See DONALD WORSTER, RIVERS OF EMPIRE: WATER, ARIDITY, AND THE GROWTH OF THE
AMERICAN WEST (1985); Freyfogle (1996), supra note 129, at 41-42 (urging reform to "the
longstanding, much-modified rule that water is available for appropriation so long as a
single drop remains in the stream or aquifer.").
139 See Jonathan Adler, Water Marketing as an Adaptive Response to the Threat of Climate
Change, HAMIINEL. REV. - (forthcoming), available at http'J/papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstractid=1097594; see also Barton H. Thompson Jr., Markets forNature, 25 WM.
& MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV. 261, 261 (2000).
'oSee Little, supra note 5, at 8-9; Choo, supra note 5, at 56-61.
141 WESTERN RESOURCE ADVOCATES, SMART WATER: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF URBAN
WATER USE ACROSS THE SOUTHWEST 93-104 (2003), available at httpJ/www.western
resourceadvocates.org/media/pdf/SWChapter4.pdf.
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channels and changed regional hydrology.'42 As a result, private sector
solutions, such as water marketing, look increasingly attractive to policy
makers and the public.'43 Moreover, even public water suppliers act in an
essentially proprietary capacity, seeking to satisfy consumers and manage
economic risk.'"
C. Water as a Consumer Commodity
Even more broadly than embracing privatized public water
systems and private water rights, American society and public policy are
increasingly framing water solely as a consumer commodity.145 In this
mindset, the primary purpose of water is to satisfy consumer demand
for it, regardless of whether the consumers are agricultural irrigators
142 ROBERT GLENNON, WATER FOLLIES: GROUNDWATER PUMPING AND THE FATE OF AMERICA'S
FRESH WATERS (2002); SANDRA POSTEL AND BRIAN RICHTER, RIVERS FOR LIFE: MANAGING
WATER FOR PEOPLE AND NATURE (2003); WET GROWTH: SHOULD WATER LAW CONTROL
LAND USE? (Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold ed., 2005); CYNTHIA BARNETT, MIRAGE: FLORIDA
AND THE VANISHING WATER OF THE EASTERN U.S. (2007); Klein, supra note 8, at 1012-50;
Glennon, supra note 18, at 1874-76; Choo, supra note 5, at 56-61.
1
"
2 See, e.g., Adler, supra note 139; Olen Paul Matthews, Fundamental Questions About
Water Rights and Market Reallocation, 40 WATER RESOURCES RES. W09S08 1 (2004),
available at http'J/www.geo.oregonstate.edu/classes/ecosys-info/readings/2003WR002836
.pdf; Neuman, supra note 5, at 489-98; Thompson, supra note 139, at 262.
144 See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 142; Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Working Out an
Environmental Ethic: Anniversary Lessons from Mono Lake, 4 WYO. L. REV. 1, 13-23, 36-
38 (2004) (highlighting the example of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power and
its consumptive uses of Mono Lake's feeder streams); Hayes, supra note 18, at 19-24. For
examples of public sector development of water to serve private interests, see, for example,
F. LEE BROWN & HELEN M. INGRAM, WATER AND POVERTY IN THE SOUTHWEST (1987);
WORSTER, supra note 138; Daniel McCool, The River Commons:A New Era in U.S. Water
Policy, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1903, 1912 & n.64 (2005).
145 See Glennon, supra note 18, at 1889. For an international perspective on the framing
of water as a consumer commodity, see Astle, supra note 50, at 587-90. Eric Freyfogle
frames the issue by noting that
Conservation is in trouble today, not chiefly at the level of legal detail
where scholars and lawyers focus their work, but at the larger, cultural
scale. The vast entertainment industry in all its forms (including those
labeled as "news") pound people day by day, minute by minute, with
messages that undercut conservation values: live life with no bounds;
consume now; think only of yourself; forget the future; perhaps above
all, remain happily ignorant of the harms that American-style living
causes worldwide.
Eric T. Freyfogle, Private Rights in a Connected Land, in WET GROWTH: SHOULD WATER
LAW CONTROL LAND USE? 320 (Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, ed., 2005).
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receiving federally subsidized water,'4 ' commercial or industrial enter-
prises that expect localities to provide abundant supplies and up-to-date
infrastructure to support their private profit-making ventures, 47 or
members of residential households who feel entitled to fill their pools, keep
their non-native lawns looking lush, take long showers, and have ready
access to bottled water." Conservation is inconvenient. Remarkably,
many homeowners in Las Vegas expressed defiance towards government
limits on lawn watering in a climate that receives three to five inches of
rainfall per year.'4 ' They insisted that they were entitled to grassy lawns
in the desert."'
Moreover, scarcity and competition increase pressures to get water
now from any available source, regardless of where it is or regardless of
the long-term ecological impacts.'5 ' Water markets and trans-basin trans-
fers have become popular policy proposals in order to satisfy consumer
demand." 2 As a result, water has become disconnected conceptually and
politically from its places of origin: particular watersheds, ecosystems, and
landscapes."3 Even some attempts to protect the environmental features
146 See McCool, supra note 144, at 1912-16.
141 See Douglas Jehl, A New Frontier in Water Wars Emerges in East, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3,
2003, at Al, A21.
" See Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Introduction: Integrating Water Controls and Land
Use Controls: New Ideas and Old Obstacles, in WET GROWTH: SHOULD WATER LAW
CONTROL LAND USE? 24-28 (Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold ed., 2005).
149 See id. at 26-27.
150 Id.
151 BARNETT, supra note 142; GLENNON, supra note 142; POSTEL & RICHTER, supra note
142; Freyfogle, supra note 129, at 41-42; Klein, supra note 8, 1151-67; Glennon, supra note
18, at 1873-76; see also WORSTER, supra note 138 (a primary theme of Worster's history
of water development in the West).
152 See, e.g., Neuman, supra note 5, at 455-62; Matthews, supra note 143, at 4-8; Adler,
supra note 139.
153 FREYFOGLE (1998), supra note 104 ; FREYFOGLE (2003), supra note 18, at; GLENNON,
supra note 142; MARJORIE M. HOLLAND, ELIZABETH R. BLOOD, & LAWRENCE R. SHAFFER,
ACHIEVING SUSTAINABLE FRESHWATER SYSTEMS: AWEB OF CONNECTIONS (2003); POSTEL
& RICHTER, supra note 142; Robert W. Adler, The Law at the Water's Edge: Limits to
"Ownership"ofAquatic Ecosystems, in WET GROWTH: SHOULD WATER LAW CONTROL LAND
USE? 201-69 (CraigAnthony (Tony) Arnold ed., 2005); CraigAnthony (Tony) Arnold, Clean-
Water Land Use: Connecting Scale and Function, 23 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 291, 301-12
(2006); Arnold, supra note 144, at 26-48; Freyfogle, supra note 129, at 43-47; Christine
A. Klein, Water Transfers: The Case Against Transbasin Diversions in Eastern States, 25
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POLY 249, 250-59 (2008); Klein, supra note 8, at 1051-67; Janet
Neuman, Dusting Off the Blueprint for a Dryland Democracy: Incorporating Watershed
Integrity and WaterAvailability Into Land Use Decisions, in WET GROWTH: SHOULD WATER
LAW CONTROL LAND USE? 119-69 (Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold ed., 2005).
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of water, such as private water trusts' and monetary valuation of eco-
system services, 55 are seeking to rely on the economic value of water and
watersheds and on consumer demand for healthy environment. Public
policy is framed in terms of satisfying private consumer interest. Indeed,
one of the problems of modernity is that social institutions and govern-
ment regimes are themselves engines of consumerism and the "growth
imperative," responding to public dependence on perpetual growth by
supporting and facilitating uses of natural resources beyond nature's
carrying capacity.5 6
Some of these developments are deeply disturbing and others are
merely practical options recognizing the economic characteristics of water in
human society. However, all of them illustrate an essentially privatized con-
cept ofwater as a commodity for human use and consumption, even if consumer
demand is satisfied by a combination of public sector and market institutions.
II. HUMAN RIGHTS AND WATER PRIVATIZATION IN THE UNITED
STATES
Water privatization raises important issues of human rights, as
demonstrated by human-rights-based opposition to water privatization
efforts worldwide."' Given that water is essential to life, one cannot be a
" See Mary Ann King, Getting Our Feet Wet: An Introduction to Water Trusts, 28 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 495, 495-96 (2004).
155 See Stephen C. Farber, Robert Costanza, & Matthew A. Wilson, Economic and
Ecological Concepts for Valuing Ecosystem Services, 41 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 375, 384-89
(2002); Sandra Postel & Stephen Carpenter, Freshwater Ecosystem Services, in NATURE'S
SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS 195-214 (Gretchen C. Daily,
ed., 1997); James Salzman, A Field of Green? The Past and Future of Ecosystem Services,
21 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 133, 139-41 (2006); James Salzman, Valuing Ecosystem
Services, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 887, 892-98 (1997). Jim Chen raises concerns that
The instrumentalist view inherent in the ecosystem services concept
dictates that the "chemical, physical, and biological" integrity of basic
environmental media such as water not be viewed as an objective for its
own sake, but rather as the crucial first step toward achieving human
goals such as "propagation offish" and "recreation in and on the water."
Jim Chen, Webs of Life: Biodiversity Conservation as a Species of Information Policy, 89
IOWA L. REV. 495, 548 (2004).
"5 Robert J. Antonio, Climate Change, the Resource Crunch, and the Global Growth
Imperative, 26 CURRENT PERSP. IN SOC. THEORY - (forthcoming 2009) (on file with
author). For a defense of the role of government in supporting commercial ventures and
markets based on a political theory of the U.S. as a commercial republic, see Stephen L.
Elkin, City and Regime in the American Republic (1987).
157 See, e.g., CONCA, supra note 50, at 246-48; Sarah I. Hale, Water Privatization in the
Philippines: The Need to Implement the Human Right to Water, 15 PAC. RIM. L. & POLY
J. 765,767-68 (2006); O'Neill, supra note 50, at 457-60; Petrova, supra note 48, at 578-82;
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human being-at least for very long-without adequate supplies of clean
drinking water. Therefore, it would seem to follow that reasonable access
to sufficient quantities of clean drinking water to support human life would
be a universal right of every human. 5 ' In addition, given that seriously
degraded environmental conditions, such as contaminated waters, harm
human life, it would seem to follow that every human has a right to life in
a watershed that is at least minimally healthy and functioning.159
These general principles, however, encounter several formidable
obstacles to being translated into operational rights, especially in the
United States.
First, there is arguably no universal human right to clean drinking
water or to basic environmental conditions expressly recognized in generally
applicable and binding international agreements. The three core documents
on human rights, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948),16 ° the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), s1 and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1966),162
make no express mention of either type of right. Environmental human
rights and/or human rights to water are expressly recognized only in inter-
pretive comments to international covenants, international agreements
applicable only to specific circumstances, various non-binding declarations,
Melina Williams, Note, Privatization and the Human Right to Water: Challenges for the
New Century, 28 MICH. J. INT'L L. 469, 470-72 (2007).
" See Astle, supra note 50, at 585-86; Erik B. Bluemel, The Implications of Formulating
a Human Right to Water, 31 ECOLOGYL.Q. 957,962-77 (2004); Malgosia Fitzmaurice, The
Human Right to Water, 18 FoRDHAM ENvTL. L. REv. 537,537-39 (2007); Amy Hardberger,
Whose Job is it Anyway?: Governmental Obligations Created by the Human Right to Water,
41 TEx. INT'L L.J. 533,536-41 (2006); Amy Hardberger, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of
Water: Evaluating Water as a Human Right and the Duties and Obligations it Creates,
4 Nw. J. INT'L HUM. RTs. 331, 331-333 (2005); Stephen C. McCaffrey, A Human Right to
Water: Domestic and International Implications, 5 GEO. INTL ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 1-3 (1992);
Ramin Pejan, The Right to Water: The Road to Justiciability, 36 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV.
1181, 1181-83 (2004); Pedro de Jesus Pallares Yabur, The Human Right to Water and the
Great Lakes Basin, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REv. 1323, 1323-25 (2006). See generally SVITLANA
KRAVCHENKO & JOHN E. BONINE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ENvIRONMENT: CASES, LAW,
AND POLICY 112-46 (2008).
159 For a discussion of human rights as they relate to environmental conditions, see
KRAVCHENKO & BONINE, supra note 158, at 113-46.
' Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess.,
1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
161 International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), G.A. Res. 2200A, at 52,
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, 21st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966).
112 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), G.A. Res.
2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49,21st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966).
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and specific regional protocols or agreements. The strongest of these is
General Comment No. 15, The Right to Water, to the International Cove-
nant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights." Issued by the United
Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General
Comment No. 15 asserts that the Covenant's express recognition of each
person's right to an adequate standard of living implicitly contains a right
to water, which is fundamental to an adequate standard of living."4 Despite
the patent logic of this interpretation, it is not itself a binding agreement
ratified by nations. The right to water is expressly protected in some interna-
tional agreements, such as the Geneva Conventions and U.N. Standard
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners," and conventions govern-
ing the rights of women and children," but these agreements have specific
applications and do not establish a universal human right. Regional human
rights treaties, such as the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the
Child167 and the San Salvador Protocol,1" establish human rights to water
or a healthy environment, but do not apply globally. Some have argued that
the right to water is implicit in the right to development, as established by
the U.N. Declaration on the Right to Development.'69 Most experts in envi-
ronmental human rights, however, speak of human rights to water and the
environment as emerging, aspirational, or implicit rights.7 '
6 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, Report
on the Twenty-Eighth and Twenty-Ninth Sessions: General Comment No. 15, The Right
to Water, 120, U.N. Doc. E/C 12/2002/13 (2002).
16 4 Id.
165 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and Relating to the
Protection ofVictims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), adopted June 8, 1977,
125 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 54; Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, adopted
Aug. 30, 1955, First United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treat-
ment of Offenders, U.N. Doc. A/CONF/611, annex I, E.S.C. res. 663C, 24 U.N. ESCOR
Supp. (No. 1), at 11, U.N. Doc E/3048 (1957), amended E.S.C. res. 2076,62 U.N. ESCOR
Supp. (No.1), at 35, U.N. Doc. E/5988 (1977), at 13, 15, 21.
166 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A.
Res. 34/180, art. 14(2)(h), U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46), 34th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (Dec. 18,
1979); Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25 annex, art. 24, U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 49), 44th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (Nov. 20, 1989).
167 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child art. 14(2)(c), OAU Doc.
CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990), entered into force Nov. 25, 1999.
16 KRAVCHENKO & BONINE, supra note 158, at 4 (quoting and citing The Additional
Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights, ratified by 14 nations in the American hemisphere but not the United
States or Canada).
"'
69 Astle, supra note 50, at 592-93.
170 See Fitzmaurice, supra note 158, at 537-56; Hardberger (2006), supra note 158, at
534-41; Hardberger (2005), supra note 158, at 331-33; McCaffrey, supra note 158, at 1-5;
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Second, even if a human right to water or to basic environmental
conditions were to be recognized internationally, it is not clear exactly
what this right would mean. For example, is it an affirmative right to re-
ceive water and live in certain conditions or is it the right to unhindered
access to water and good environments? It is far easier for judicial bodies
or legislative or executive bodies at national or international levels to use
human rights as limitations on decisions that would patently harm human
access to safe and clean water-basically negative rights-than it would
be to force governments to affirmatively provide specific quantities of safe
and clean water to every person within their respective j urisdictions-the
full effectuation of affirmative rights to resources.17' Moreover, how much
water would a person be entitled to receive? Even estimates of the minimal
amount of water for human survival by the World Health Organization
range from as little as five liters per person per day for hydration to one
hundred liters per person per day for hydration, cooking, sanitation, and
hygiene. 172 How clean would the water have to be? Would the person be
entitled to the water for free? If so, who would pay for it? If the person
would be required to pay for water that he or she consumes, is there a limit
on how much can be charged? Should this limit be determined by ability
to pay, physical conditions of supply and scarcity, proportionate share of
the cost to obtain and distribute the water, or market conditions of
supply and demand? More importantly, will clean and safe water or
environmental conditions actually be available simply because a right to
them is declared?
One of the basic problems with human rights principles is that,
by themselves, they do not induce public or private investment in water
systems and services or overcome both physical and economic conditions
that lead to scarcity for some populations. Indeed, advocates of privatiza-
tion argue that recognition of human rights in water discourages private
investment because of the resulting insecurity about the likely returns
on the investment.' 3 An unresolved question about human rights to
water and basic environmental conditions is whether private companies
Petrova, supra note 43, at 593-601; Williams, supra note 157, at 472-80. But see Astle,
supra note 50, at 590 (arguing that sufficient international consensus has developed that
water is a basic human right to justify its enforcement on the basis of customary inter-
national law).
171 See Hardberger (2006), supra note 158, at 541-66; see also Yabur, supra note 158, at
1325-29.172 See Hardberger (2006), supra note 158, at 540-41.
173 See SEGERFELDT, supra note 46.
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are responsible for ensuring that they are met or liable for breaches of
them.'74 For the most part, there has been far more international consensus
that human rights are operable and legally enforceable against governments
than there has been about the nature and degree of their enforceability
against business entities, nonprofit entities, or individuals.' 7' Nonetheless,
attempts to enforce affirmative rights to water and/or environmental con-
ditions against a government that does not have the resources to provide
these basics for its citizens may simply be exercises in futility.
In addition, global water scarcity problems are, in some substantial
part, physical problems of geography, hydrology, and distributional capac-
ity. About 80% of the people in the world who lack adequate water and
sanitation live in rural areas, mostly remote and dispersed geographi-
cally. 176 This fact makes it very expensive for either financially strapped
governments or risk averse private corporations to provide water where
the need is the greatest.'77 While human rights advocates use aspirational
language describing the universality and fundamentality of basic human
rights, water specialists use the term "wet water," which reminds us of
the practical barriers to rights and norms translating into actual water
supplies. The term "wet water" means actual supplies of water that are
available to be put to particular uses in particular locations, in contrast
to mere conceptual, or "paper," rights to water.
178
Third, human rights in water and environmental conditions argu-
ably conflict with environmental ethics at some level. Critics of a human
rights approach to environmental protections would argue that such an
approach is highly anthropocentric, elevating the rights of humans to the
consumption of nature over the rights of other species and of nature itself
174 See Petrova, supra note 48, at 583, 593, 598.
... See Hardberger, supra note 158, at 532-66; see, e.g., Pejan, supra note 158, at 1196-1202.
'
76 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, supra note 51, at 1.
17 James Salzman points out that water has never been free and that substantial capital
investment, facilitated by cost recovery and a return on investment, is needed to create
the water distribution infrastructure needed, yet the potential for this investment is in-
hibited by a lack of ability to pay. Salzman, supra note 50, at 113-17; see also Williams,
supra note 157, at 503; O'Neill, supra note 50, at 359 (privatization creates incentives for
capital investment in the development and provision ofwater services); Astle, supra note
50, at 587 (describing the costs associated with supplying clean drinking water).17
1 See Susan D. Brienza, Wet Water vs. Paper Rights: Indian and Non-Indian Negotiated
Settlements and Their Effects, 11 STAN. ENvTL. L.J. 151, 152 (1992) (outlining this tension
as it plays out from Native American tribes in the U.S. West). See generally Hardberger
(2006), supra note 158 (discussing the difficulties of translating human rights into actual
water supplies); Astle, supra note 50 (discussing the difficulties of translating human rights
into actual water supplies).
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or the ecocentric responsibilities and duties of humans as integral parts of
nature.79 While we could think of many examples and arguments where
human interests and nature's interests coincide and even mutually sup-
port one another, the potential conflicts between the two are not purely
theoretical. For example, transferring substantial amounts of water from
areas of water abundance to arid areas of greatest human need can im-
pose tremendous ecological harm on the source watersheds that support
humid ecosystems and depend on return flows, not to mention the energy
costs and related environmental outputs of transporting water great dis-
tances 80 Moreover, a legal and political entitlement to water facilitates
migration to areas of water scarcity,'8 ' undermines conservation, and pro-
motes over-consumption, except in relatively closed communal water
systems where informal group norms discourage waste.82
Fourth, the United States legal system and socio-political culture
do not provide much, if any, recognition for affirmative human rights to
minimum levels of safe and clean water and aquatic environments. U.S.
courts do not enforce rights created in international agreements unless
Congress has expressly made them judicially enforceable in the U.S."8 3
In fact, the United States has not ratified some of the treaties expressly
or implicitly creating a positive human right to water, including the
International Convention on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the
Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
179 See FREYFOGLE, supra note 104, at 138-42 (expressing concern that incorporation of
social justice concerns into a sustainability agenda can undermine the ecological con-
servation agenda); Gabriel Eckstein, Precious, Worthless, or Immeasurable: The Value
and Ethic of Water, 38 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 963, 965-66 (2006); Aphrodite Smagadi,
Analysis of the Objectives of the Convention on Biological Diversity: Their Interrelation
and Implementation Guidance for Access and Benefit Sharing, 31 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 243,
259 (2006); Alison Lindsay Shinsato, Note, Increasing theAccountability of Transnational
Corporations for Environmental Harms: The Petroleum Industry in Nigeria, 4 NW. J.
INr' HUM. RTS. 186, 197-202 (2005).
o See Klein, supra note 153, at 259-74.
181 See Hardberger, supra note 158, at 547 (arguing that governments have affirmative
human-rights obligations to provide water to areas of need beyond their borders); Yabur,
supra note 158, at 1329-30 (exploring whether the U.S. would have a duty to supply water
from the Great Lakes Basin to poor children in Mexico who lack it).
18 2 CONCA, supra note 50, at 217; O'Neill, supra note 50, at 359 (privatization encourages
conservation).
" See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 353-54 (2006); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack
L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399,
399-403 (2000); Jack Goldsmith, International Human Rights Law and the United States
Double Standard, 1 GREEN BAG 2D 365,367 (1998).
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Women, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.' Moreover, in
our legal, social, and political culture, we give judicial enforcement to
negative political and civil rights that guarantee individuals freedom
from certain exercises of government power but do not tend to recognize
positive rights to basic human necessities, such as food, shelter, water,
or a clean and safe environment." 5 For example, attempts to amend the
U.S. Constitution to provide a fundamental right to environmental pro-
tection have repeatedly failed,'86 and only six states-Hawaii, Illinois,
Massachusetts, Montana, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island-have adopted
such a right in their state constitutions,'87 despite the popularity and
strength of the environmental movement in the United States. Instead of
speaking of human rights, we tend in this nation to frame rights in terms
of constitutional rights, individual rights and freedoms, and political and
civil rights.
However, we also tend to frame affirmative duties of government
in terms of the public interest or public rights. Despite the strong protec-
tion of individual freedoms from government interference, there is also a
modest protection of the public's interests in natural resources, environ-
mental policies, and government decision making. This is the point where
human rights concerns over water and the environment are most salient
in the American legal tradition.'88
The water law doctrines and systems identified previously' 89 --the
public trust doctrine, the state ownership doctrine, correlative rights, the
anti-speculation doctrine, the beneficial use doctrine, regulatory permitting
systems, public interest review, environmental regulation, public utility
rate regulation, and the usufructuary or nonpossessory nature of water
rights, among others-provide strong conceptual foundations and useful
legal tools for protecting the public's interests in water and water systems.
Moreover, non-discrimination principles in U.S. law can also be helpful. 9 °
'8 See Goldsmith, supra note 183, at 367.
See Bryan P. Wilson, Comment, State Constitutional Environmental Rights and Judicial
Activism: Is the Big Sky Falling?, 53 EMoRY L.J. 627, 635-39 (2004).
" See David Takacs, The Public Trust Doctrine, Environmental Human Rights, and the
Future of Private Property, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 711, 730 (2008).
... See id. at 730 n.106.
See id. at 730; Zellmer & Harder, supra note 104, at 696.
189 See discussion supra Part I.B.
'
9 For a brief overview of the nondiscrimination principle in U.S. constitutional law, in-
cluding a critique that is largely limited to formal equality in government actions with
respect to suspect classifications of race, national origin, and gender, see Gil Kujovich,
Comment on Accommodating Differences in Constitutional Law, 30 VT. L. REV. 489 (2006).
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For example, residents of the mostly African American Coal Run neighbor-
hood in rural east-central Ohio recently received $11 million to remedy
the government's discrimination against them in running water lines in
throughout the area but not in Coal Run. 9' The powers of federal, state,
and local governments to regulate private sector activity in order to pro-
tect the public also serve to effectuate basic human and public rights. For
example, local land use laws and subdivision controls now operate to en-
sure basic water infrastructure is provided; lack of such regulatory controls
can result in situations like the Texas colonias, where private developers
created entire communities for low-income Latinos in unincorporated
areas near the U.S.-Mexico border that lack water services and other
basic public services.'92 Public entities are concerned with policy consider-
ations, social equity, politics, and impacts of thirsty low-income residents
on society.193 For example, low-income people, who may struggle to afford
all basic needs (e.g., water, housing, food, energy, medical care), benefit
from public sector water system water rates that are often below-market,
or essentially publicly subsidized.194 These artificially low rates, though,
incent waste in consumers who can afford to pay higher rates.'95
The doctrines designed to protect the public's interest in water
work imperfectly and do not guarantee that every individual has a legal
entitlement to a specified amount of water or a certain standard of envi-
ronmental conditions. However, U.S. legal theories use the political and
social nature of water-water as a community resource-to protect and ad-
vance the human interest in water as a necessity of life and the ecological
characteristics of water as part of biological, physical, and chemical systems
in nature.
See Dirk Johnson, For a Recently Plumbed Neighborhood, Validation in a Verdict, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 11, 2008, http'//www.nytimes.com/2008/08/12/us/12ohio.html; Eoin O'Carroll,
Black Ohio Neighborhood- Denied Water for Decades, CHRIsTIAN Sci. MoNrrOR, July 11,
2008, http://features.csmonitor.com/environment/2008/07/11/black-ohio-neighborhood-
unjustly-denied-water-for-decades-jury-finds/; Claire Suddath, Making Water a Matter of
Race, TIME, July 14,2008, http'/www.time.com/timenation/article/0,8599,1822455,00.html.
"
9 See Jane E. Larson, Free Markets Deep in the Heart of Texas, 84 GEO. L.J. 179, 183 (1995).
.
93 See Thayer v. Cal. Dev. Co., 128 P. 21, 29 (Cal. 1912) (differentiating between public
and private suppliers of water); See also Fauconnier, supra note 20, at 42, 45-46, 59-61;
Rosenblum, supra note 23, at A.3. However, there is also evidence that public water
institutions serve private interests and values. See BROWN & INGRAM, supra note 144;
WORSTER, supra note 138.
19 See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 20, at 86-88; Lavelle, supra note
23; Rosenblum, supra note 23, at A.3. For a discussion ofthe nuances, merits, and contro-
versies of subsidizing water for basic human needs, see GLEICK, supra note 20, at 31-34.
'
9 5 See supra note 194.
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III. NATIONAL SECURITY AND WATER PRIVATIZATION IN THE UNITED
STATES
Private control over water resources also raises several potential
risks to national security from: 1) inter-jurisdictional conflicts over scarce
water resources; 2) foreign control of domestic water supplies; and 3) vul-
nerabilities of water supplies to acts of terrorism.
A. Conflict and Scarcity
Conflict and competition over water is one of the major sources of
armed conflicts between nations and groups throughout world history.
196
Scarcity and competing diversions for water among nations has led to
armed conflict or other national security problems along the Jordan River
Basin (among Israel, Jordan, Syria), the Nile River Basin (among Egypt,
Ethiopia, and the Sudan), and the Euphrates River Basin (among Turkey,
Syria, and Iraq).'97 In fact, in 1995, the then Vice-President of the World
Bank predicted that water would replace oil as the resource over which
wars would be fought in the twenty-first century.9 ' Global conflict over
water will affect U.S. foreign policy and security worldwide.199 Privatiza-
tion is likely to contribute to global conflict over water, because: 1) civil
unrest over private control over water and the typical substantial rate
increases that accompanying privatization may spark inter-group conflict
across borders or put political pressure on national governments to seek
new supplies of water from transnational sources; °0 and 2) private water
196 See Peter H. Gleick, Water and Conflict: Fresh Water Resources and International
Security, 18 INT'L SEC. 79, 79 (1993); Christopher L. Kukk & David A. Deese, At the
Water's Edge: Regional Conflict and Cooperation over Fresh Water, 1 UCLA J. INT'L L. &
FOREIGN AFF. 21, 31 (1996); Williams, supra note 157, at 471. The Middle East has ex-
perienced particularly virulent fights over water. See generally JOHN BULLOCH & ADEL
DARWISH, WATER WARS: COMING CONFLICTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST (1993).
197 See Kukk & Deese, supra note 196, at 35-50.
... See O'Neill, supra note 50, at 358; see also Colleen P. Graffy, Water, Water, Everywhere,
Nor Any Drop to Drink: The Urgency of Transnational Solutions to International Riparian
Disputes, 10 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 399, 408 (1998).
199 See Neuman, supra note 52, at 231-41 (arguing that water is particularly salient to
international security and U.S. foreign policy); Elizabeth Burleson, Water Is Security, 31
ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL'Y J. 197, 199 (2008).
20 Even along the peaceful U.S./ Canadian border, water privatization has created some
political unrest. See SGM Publications, The Union War on Water Privatization, http://
www.sgmlaw.com/en/about/publicationlPublicationsUnionWaronWaterPrivatization.cfin
(last visited Apr. 7, 2009).
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corporations may transfer water supplies in some countries to users in
other countries who are willing to pay more for the water.201
Moreover, conflict over water will affect U.S. domestic security.
Three scenarios are possible in the U.S. in an environment of increasing
privatization. First, tensions and conflicts between the U.S. and other
nations could develop as private water exporters tap U.S. waters to meet
needs elsewhere in the world, or as U.S. water consumers seek new sources
from shared waters, oceans, or other parts of the world to meet relentless
consumer demand. Second, civil unrest and protests over privatization
of public water services in the U.S. could weaken internal security. These
domestic conflicts over privatization could also develop into conflicts and
tensions with nations that are home to multinational water companies,
such as France and Germany.
Third, the combination of increased consumption patterns, norms,
and the failure of existing water governance institutions to adapt to re-
gional or temporal scarcity are resulting in regional and interstate water
conflicts in many areas of the U.S.20 2 These conflicts may undermine in-
ternal security and distract government leaders from addressing global
threats to domestic security, such as terrorism. Some of the many con-
tributing factors to these regional water conflicts involve privatization
trends. One is the influence of private interests in advancing their self-
interested water use goals and, in the process, undermining conservation
goals, cooperative or collaborative solutions, and adaptation of water in-
stitutions to changing conditions and societal needs. Another trend con-
tributing to regional water conflict is the framing of water as a consumer
commodity that should be plentiful and cheap to meet human wants,
regardless of the environment-sustaining, community-defining, or power-
distributing functions of water.
20 Though not an international border issue, Arizona proposed allowing its water to be
exported to thirsty Las Vegas, Nevada. Arizona's citizen expressed great concern. Joe
Gelt, Arizona-to-Nevada Water Export Plan Proposed, Contested, ARIz. WATERRES., May-
June 2007, httpJ/ag.arizona.edu/AZWATER/awr/mayjuneO7/featurel.html.
202 See PETER ANNIN, THE GREAT LAKES WATER WARS (2006); CRAIG ANTHONY ARNOLD &
LEIGH A. JEWELL, BEYOND LITIGATION: CASE STUDIES IN WATER RIGHTS DISPUTrEs (2002);
HOLLY DOREMUS & A. DAN TARLOCK, WATER WAR IN THE KLAMATH BASIN: MACHO LAW,
COMBAT BIOLOGY, AND DIRTY POLITICS (2008); ADAPTIVE GOVERNANCE AND WATER
CoNFLICT: NEW INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLABORATIVE PLANNING 74-88 (John T. Scholz &
Bruce Stiftel, eds., 2005); Dellapenna, supra note 10; Ruhl, supra note 10, at 49-53; Ruhl,
supra note 5, at 47-49; Choo, supra note 5, at 56-61; Little, supra note 5, at 8-9.
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B. Foreign Control of Domestic Water Supplies
Another national security issue is the degree to which foreign-owned
and foreign-operated private corporations control public water systems,
water rights, and actual water resources in the U.S., making the American
public vulnerable to decisions that may not adequately protect its inter-
ests. As discussed in Part I.A.2, most of the private owners or operators
of public water systems in the United States are subsidiaries of French or
German corporations." 3
International free trade agreements may serve to protect foreign
or multinational corporations' rights to export U.S. water supplies to other
nations." 4 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT")2 °. and
the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA) 2 °6 support the
international treatment of water as a tradable good or commodity for
which prohibitions on transfers could be deemed impermissible export
restrictions.0 7 However, there is an argument that restrictions on water
exports might be permissible under exceptions for nonrenewable resources,
particularly if these transfers threaten the sustainability of particular
water systems or watersheds. 28 Nonetheless, the U.S. Supreme Court
203 See discussion supra Part I.A.2.
2 4 On the issue of international water exports, see Scanlan, supra note 66 (discussing the
export of water from the Great Lakes through bottled water sales).
205 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700,
55 U.N.T.S. 194; see also Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States, Classification
2201: Waters, including natural or artificial mineral waters and aerated waters, not
containing added sugar or other sweetening matter nor flavored; ice and snow (2009),
available at http://hts.usitc.gov/.
206 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3312-17 (2006),
32 I.L.M. 289; see also Dr. Isabel A1-Assar, Water as a Commodity, Paper Presentation
Before the Third International Water Law Symposium, University of Dundee (June 14,
2000), available at http://www.waterbank.com/Newsletters/nwsl8.html; Stephen Leahy,
Canada: Losing Water through NAFTA, Sept. 23, 2007, http://www.globalresearch.ca/
index.php?context=va&aid=6859 (last visited Apr. 8, 2009).211 See CONCA, supra note 50, at 223-27; Jennifer Naegele, What is Wrong With Full-Fledged
Privatization?, 6 J. L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 99, 109 (2004) (noting that NAFTA and GAT
define water as a tradable good, service, and investment, and asserting that government
regulation of water may be an illegal barrier to trade).2o1 See id.; see also GLEICK, supra note 20, at 15-20; Brian D. Anderson, Selling Great Lakes
Water to a Thirsty World: Legal, Policy & Trade Considerations, 6 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 215,
238-42 (1999); Milos Baruteiski, Trade Regulation of Fresh Water Exports: The Phantom
Menace Revisited, 28 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 145 (2002); Sanford E. Gaines, Fresh Water:
Environment or Trade?, 28 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 157 (2002); A. Dan Tarlock, How Well Can
International Water Allocation Regimes Adapt to Global Climate Change?, 15 J. LAND
USE & ENVTL. L. 423, 443 (2000).
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has declared groundwater to be an article of interstate commerce, 209 which
would support the argument of foreign exporters of water that domestic
laws cannot burden their international rights to exploit U.S. waters for
commercial gain. Moreover, some theories of the basic human right to
water would impose on governments in areas with "surplus" water the
affirmative duty to transfer the water internationally to areas with water
scarcity.210 This would create a regime of international control over
domestic supplies.21'
C. Terrorism
Terrorism poses risks to water supply systems that might be
greater for privately controlled systems than for government controlled
systems. The threats include the introduction of chemical, biological, or
radioactive contaminants into reservoirs of public drinking water or into
the water distribution system.212 However, given the large amount of con-
taminants needed to pollute large amounts of drinking water and the like-
lihood that treatment works will eliminate the harm from any substances
introduced pre-treatment, 13 the more serious risk is damage to pumping
'0' See Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 953-54 (1982).
210 See, e.g., Yabur, supra note 158, at 1327-28.
211 See id. (noting that such a regime could be established through treaty obligations).
212 See B. Suzi Ruhl, The Role of Homeland Security in Drinking Water Safety, SL036
ALI-ABA 217, 219-20 (2005). See generally OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S.
ENvIRoNMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EVALUATION REPORT, SURVEY RESULTS ON
INFORMATION USED BY WATER UTILITIES TO CONDUCT VULNERABILTYASSESSMENTS, REPORT
No. 2004-M-0001 (2004); Robert M. Anderson, The Emerging Field ofEnvironmental Security
Law and ItsApplicability to Water Resources and Infrastructure, 2005 ALI-ABA 227 (2005);
Peter H. Gleick, Water and Terrorism, 8 WATER POLICY 481 (2006); Itzchak E. Kornfeld,
Terror in the Water: Threats to Drinking Water and Infrastructure, 9 WIDENER L. SYMP. J.
439, 449-54 (2003); Steven D. Shermer, The Drinking Water Security and Safety
Amendments of 2002: Is America's Drinking Water Infrastructure Safer Four Years Later?,
24 UCLA J. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 355, 407-19 (2006); Varu Chilakamarri, Note, A New
Instrument in National Security: The Legislative Attempt to Combat Terrorism via the Safe
Drinking WaterAct, 91 GEo. L.J. 927,946-47 (2003); U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
Water Security, http'Jvww.epa.gov/safewater/security/index.ctm (last visited Feb. 24,2009).213 See Vicki Kemper, Flood of Money Targets Drinking Water Security, L.A. TIMES, July 28,
2002, at 20; Genevieve Marshall, Security is Watered Down at Reservoirs, Treatment Plants,
MORNING CALL (Allentown, PA), Mar. 30, 2003, at Al. But see Ruhl, supra note 212, at
221 (emphasizing growing concern about terrorist contamination of drinking water by
introducing contaminants, especially disinfectant-resistant pathogens, directly into dis-
tribution system post-treatment); Kornfeld supra note 212, at 468-72 (discussing use of
Cryptosporiodiosis and Giaradia as tools of terror if introduced into disinfected, filtered
water supplies). -
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or distribution equipment that could shut down public water supplies to sig-
nificant numbers of people.214 Although an explosion at a critical location
could cause widespread harm that could not be fixed quickly, it has been
said that great harm could be done by someone with merely a hammer,
screwdriver, and access to water system machinery or pipes.215
At some level, all public water systems are vulnerable, regardless
of who is operating them.216 In response, the U.S. Congress enacted the
Public Health, Security, and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act
of 2002.217 The Act requires public water systems to prepare emergency
response plans to address threats to water supplies and to conduct and
submit vulnerability assessments to the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency.218 Both public and private water systems have bolstered security,
and many states have passed legislation or implemented programs to
enhance security of the water supply.
2 1 s
Nonetheless, private operation of local water systems supplying
basic drinking water to the public can pose certain security vulnerabilities
that public sector operation does not, as I have previously written:
Private water suppliers, just like municipal and governmen-
tal water suppliers, have called for government attention
to (and funding for) security and have engaged in height-
ened security measures. However, private water companies
usually operate with less transparency and accountability
to the public than do public entities. This fact raises three
214 See Kornfeld, supra note 212, at 447-49; Ruhl, supra note 212, at 219-220; Kemper,
supra note 213, at 20; Marshall, supra note 213, at Al.
215 See Marshall, supra note 213, at Al.
216 See Ruhl, supra note 212, at 219-220 (describing susceptibility of drinking water to the
following acts ofterrorism: 1) physical destruction of facilities; 2) cyber-attacks; 3) biological
agents added to water supply; 4) chemical agents added to water supply; 5) radioactive
materials added to water supply; 6) release of hazardous chemicals used to treat water
into the public environment).217 Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594 (2002) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-26 (2006))
(amending the Safe Drinking water Act).21 1 Id. § 401, 116 Stat. at 682 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300i-2 (2006)).
219 See Marshall, supra note 213, atAl;AWWA Seeks Federal Support for Enhanced Water
Utility Security: Security of Water Supply Essential to Homeland Security, U.S. NEWSWIRE,
Mar. 20, 2002; Deadline for Water Utility Security Assessments, Nation's Largest Water
Supplies Required to Submit Security Studies to EPA Today, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Mar. 31,
2003; U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Water Security, http:/cfpub.epa.gov/
safewater/watersecurity/index.cfm (last visited Mar. 13, 2009).
20091 825
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLy REV.
particular concerns about private control over the public's
water supply.
First, a private water system operator may have less
of a close working relationship with local law enforcement
than would a municipal water department or local water
district. In general, public operators of water systems are
either under municipal control or closely connected to local
government, and therefore involvement of local law enforce-
ment in safeguarding water supplies and monitoring poten-
tial threats and local emergency response and public health
officials in responding to emergencies is likely to be greater
(recognizing, though, that some inter-departmental or inter-
agency communication within government can be quite
poor). A private company may be less likely to cooperate
with local law enforcement and emergency and public
health officials simply due to poorly developed lines of com-
munication, unfamiliarity of local officials with the private
company's operations, or desires to keep confidential pro-
prietary information about private operations.
Second, private entities may be less likely to reveal
information about private operations, employees, breaches
of security, and system security status than public entities
would. For example, when Congress was considering the
Public Health, Security, and Bioterrorism Preparedness and
Response Act of 2002, private water companies objected to
submitting assessments to the EPA, and instead wished
merely to certify that they had done so: Congress added pro-
visions to exempt these assessments from the Freedom of
Information Act and unauthorized disclosure. The conflict
over disclosing assessments to a federal agency illustrates a
possibly inherent tension between private interests in keep-
ing water management practices private and public inter-
ests in a well-informed, well-prepared set of anti-terrorism
specialists at local, state, and federal levels.
Third, it might be more difficult to ascertain if there
are security breaches or threats from a private company's
employees. There is no reason to believe that private com-
panies on average have poorer employee screening and
background check systems than do public entities. In fact,
the private systems on the whole might be better than the
826 [Vol. 33:785
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public systems, or the opposite might be true. What is at
issue, though, are whether public officials concerned with
public water supply security have adequate opportunity to
check a private company's processes, practices, and safe-
guards. Both public and private water service providers
have access to certain water security information that is
confidential and not made available to the general public.
However, it is not clear how widely this information is
disseminated throughout large multinational water com-
panies based in other countries, or the degree of risk that
an employee sympathetic to terrorists could access it. 220
The critical dependence of the U.S. public on public water supply
systems, surface waters, groundwater, and water infrastructure heighten
the vulnerability of these systems not only to conflict and scarcity but
also to terrorism and intentional harm. Therefore, we require savvy, far-
reaching, effective government oversight of our water supplies and facil-
ities for their security. Decentralized private control of waters and water
systems complicates the government's attempts to fulfill this responsibility.
Owners, operators, managers, and even users of water systems must affir-
matively embrace policies and practices that protect the security of our
waters and facilities, and must be held accountable for security breaches
under proactive planning and oversight, use of best practices, frequent
inspection and review by government water security experts, and effective
enforcement mechanisms. Nonetheless, national security policies with
respect to water far too often focus solely on preventing terrorism and in-
tentional harm and do not sufficiently treat other aspects of water security
and sustainability-long-range planning, conservation, equitable distri-
bution, watershed and ecological protections, growth management, adap-
tive management of waters, improving existing institutional capacity and
developing new institutional capacity, public education and development
of social ethics, development of scientific knowledge, widespread use of
impact assessment methods, inter-group and inter-jurisdictional conflict
resolution, land use and energy use policies, and allocation policies and
systems-as critical to national security.
22 Arnold, supra note 19, at 595-96 (internal citations omitted). But see generally Kenneth
A. Bamberger, Global Terror, Private Infrastructure, and Domestic Governance, in 2 THE
IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION ON THE UNITED STATES: LAW AND GOVERNANCE 203-28 (2008)
(arguing that private sector responses to terrorism risk are preferable to top-down govern-
ment regulation).
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IV. PUBLIC STEWARDSHIP OF WATER
A. The Harms of Privatization and Commodification of Water
Private control and commodification of water in the United States
pose large-scale and long-term risks and harms of which human rights con-
cerns and national security risks are only parts. Private control and commod-
ification of water threaten the integrity and sustainability of waters, water
systems, and watersheds in interconnected human and natural systems.
Privatization and commodification of water fail to achieve ecological
integrity and sustainability, because water is treated as disaggregated
into discrete units of private control and consumption, instead of being
considered part of interdependent human and natural communities.22'
A private commodity concept of water fails to see the sustainability of
human life as integrally tied to the sustainability of entire ecosystems,
biodiversity and biological life, and nature's hydrology. For example, private
development of wetlands eliminates critical natural biodiversity, filtration,
and absorption functions, contributing to disasters like the flooding of New
Orleans after Hurricane Katrina.' Over-pumping of groundwater sources,
whether by private landowners, water bottling companies, or sprawling
cities meeting consumer demand, leads to adverse alterations of inter-
connected groundwater-surface water hydrology (e.g., saltwater intrusion,
dropping aquifer levels) and landscapes (e.g., subsidence, loss of native
vegetation).223 Private water companies calculate the value of source water
protection lands in trade-offs between potential treatment costs savings
and potential revenues from sale or development, without considering
their other ecological and human values.224 Water diversions for con-
sumption, dams, and other "replumbing" water works for water supplies
take away instream flows that sustain aquatic species, alter basic stream
hydrology and composition, and facilitate invasive species.22
221 See FREYFOGLE, supra note 18; FREYFOGLE (1998), supra note 104; HOLLAND ET AL.,
supra note 153; POSTEL & RICHTER, supra note 142; GLENNON, supra note 142; Adler,
supra note 153; Arnold, supra note 153; Arnold, supra note 144; Klein, supra note 8;
Klein, supra note 153; Neuman, supra note 153.
222 See Craig Pittman, On the Gulf- Too Little, Too Late: A Wetlands Buffer Could Have
Made a Difference to New Orleans, PLANNING, Nov. 2005, at 10.
See GLENNON, supra note 142.
224 See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 20, at 104; Vitale, supra note 20, at
1392; Matthew Futterman, Watershed's Development Rekindles Fight, STAR-LEDGER
(Newark), Feb. 4, 1999, at 17.
See POSTEL & RICHTER, supra note 142, at 13-14; Klein, supra note 8, at 1019-29;
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Privatization and commodification fail to achieve temporal integrity
and sustainability in waters and water systems. In the U.S. culture of
private property management and market behavior, short-term profits,
quick returns, and immediate consumption are valued over long-term
investments, patient stewardship, and conservation of financial, human,
and natural capital.226 Of course, government decision making, driven by
concerns about short-term political benefits and costs, can also fail to pur-
sue the long-term viability of waters and water systems.227 However, these
political processes are essentially about the commodification of public policy
and decisionmaking to meet political consumers' demands. Decision makers
fail to engage in long-term planning and investments in infrastructure,
development, preservation, and conservation activities that will sustain
water supplies, facilities, natural waters, and watersheds for overall public
benefit far into the future.
Privatization and commodification fail to achieve geographic
integrity and sustainability. When water is treated as an abstract bundle
of private property rights or as a fungible, marketable, and transferable
commodity, it is disconnected from its physical and social place of origin.228
Waters and watersheds shape the social, cultural, and political charac-
teristics of communities that define themselves with respect to special
water-based places.229 Private rights to divert surface waters or pump
McCool, supra note 144, at 1908-11; Neuman, supra note 153, at 130-34.
' See Steven A. Ramirez,American Corporate Governance and Globalization, 18 BERKELEY
LA RAZA L.J. 47, 53-55 (2007); Neil Gunningham, Environmental Management Systems
and Community Participation: Rethinking Chemical Industry Participation, 16 UCLAJ.
ENVTL. L. & POLY 319, 394-95 (1998); see also Salzman, supra note 155, at 134 ("ecosystem
services provide both the conditions and processes that sustain human life," but these
services are rarely given value in the marketplace). See generally Salzman, supra note
155 (discussing the services provided by ecosystems, the problem of valuing these services,
and the role of environmental law in promoting widespread comprehension of ecosystem
services).
227 See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Environmental Law and Three Economies: Navigating a
Sprawling Field of Study, Practice, and Societal Governance in Which Everything is
Connected to Everything Else, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 359, 366 (1999) (discussing the
impact of short-term economic interests on inducing short-term policy decisions); McCool,
supra note 144, at 1912. See generally GLENNON, supra note 142.
228 See POSTEL & RICHTER, supra note 142, at 204; Klein, supra note 8, at 1011. See
generally FREYFOGLE, supra note 18, at 191-92; Arnold, supra note 153; Klein, supra 153;
Neuman, supra note 153.
229 See Arnold, supra note 144, at 29; Ken Conca, Environmental Governance After
Johannesburg: From Stalled Legalization to Environmental Human Rights?, 1 J. INT'L
L. & INT'L REL. 121, 132-33 (2005) (referring to site-specific conflicts over special socio-
ecological systems, such as rivers, that "are, at once, foundations of local livelihood and
culture, critical ecosystems, and extractable commodities with transnational market
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groundwater have the potential to ruin river cities, dry up local springs,
destroy fishing communities, or make lake regions mere targets of water
exports. Moreover, surface water systems are organized geographically,
for the most part, by watersheds, in which smaller areas that drain to a
common point are nested within larger areas that drain to a common point,
which are nested in still larger areas that drain to a common point, and
so forth.23 Private ownership and control of water, though, usually occurs
at spatial scales that have nothing to do with hydrology or watershed
functioning.2 31 In addition, private markets for water tend to transcend
watershed boundaries, often moving water from watershed to watershed
or even large-scale basin to large-scale basin in order to meet economic
demand.232 As a result, the watershed of origin loses return flow on which
its hydrology and ecological functioning (and often also human communities
in the region) depend, in addition to reduced instream flows or lowered
groundwater levels.233
Privatization and commodification fail to achieve socio-ethical
integrity and sustainability. Private control of water puts communities
at risk of over-consumption, failed private ventures, and lack of adequate
planning for the future. The economic failure of private water suppliers
in public water could have disastrous consequences for local communities
depending on these water supplies for both livelihoods and life. In reality,
the public sector serves as a subsidizer and guarantor of both private sec-
tor profit in water and consumption patterns to meet private wants and
interests; the government facilitates private interests and trade in water
and then steps in to manage failed systems and scarcity when private
control and markets cease to be profitable. More generally, though, defin-
ing water as a consumer good or service distributed by market trade for
private consumption disconnects water from its part in society, community,
and religion. This trend also removes water from society's ethical choices
and moral development about the use, conservation, stewardship, security,
and preservation of water in human communities and natural commu-
nities, including the ways in which water use shapes the relationships
value"); Klein, supra note 153, at 260-61; Klein, supra note 8, at 1033; Salzman, supra
note 50, at 94-98.
230 See Arnold, supra note 153, at 313-14.
231 See id. at 302; Klein, supra note 8, at 1044; A. Dan Tarlock, The Potential Role of Local
Governments in Watershed Management, 20 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 149, 162-63. See gen-
erally J.B. Ruhl et al., Proposal for a Model State Watershed Management Act, 33 ENVTL.
L. 929 (2003).
2 See Klein, supra note 153, at 252-54.
' See id. at 272-73.
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between humans and nature (e.g., landscapes, ecosystems, watersheds,
ecological processes)' and among humans (e.g., distributive, procedural,
restorative, and social justice).235 It fails to engage the public as a deliber-
ative, participatory, ethical, and decision making corpus in directly wres-
tling with difficult choices about sustainability of water resources, conser-
vation policies and behaviors, and the protection of those in society with
few or declining resources, power, and opportunities.
Privatization and commodification also fail to achieve policy integ-
rity and sustainability. Water law, policy, and markets have complex,
multi-faceted interdependence with other areas of public policy, such as
land use, 6 disaster preparation and management, 7 climate change," bio-
diversity,239 and energy.2" Strong private rights to control and use water
based on maximizing one's self-interest impede the coordination of water use
and management with other policy areas and goals, such as growth man-
agement, flood control, biodiversity conservation, reducing greenhouse gases
and adapting to climate change, and achieving "green energy" objectives.
Finally, privatization and commodification fail to achieve eco-
nomic integrity and sustainability. Many calls for privatization-and
some calls for market-based mechanisms to achieve water allocation and
"See Arnold, supra note 148, at 46-49; Arnold, supra note 144, at 28-30; Eckstein, supra
note 179, at 965-66. See generally Freyfogle, supra note 129.
" For this taxonomy of justice, see Robert R. Kuehn, A Taxonomy of Environmental
Justice, [2000] 30 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10681, 10681-82.
236 See Arnold, supra note 148, at 1, 7; Lincoln L. Davies, Just a Big, 'Hot Fuss"?:
Assessing the Value of Connecting Suburban Sprawl, Land Use, and Water Rights
Through Assured Supply Laws, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1217 (2008).237 See DANIEL A. FARBER & JIM CHEN, DISASTERS AND THE LAW: KATRINA AND BEYOND 213
(2006); JOHN R. NOLON & DANIEL B. RODRIGUEZ, LOSING GROUND: A NATION ON EDGE
(2007).23 See Noah D. Hall, Bret B. Stunz, & Robert H. Adams, Climate Change and Freshwater
Resources, NAT. RES. & ENV'T, Winter 2008, at 30, 30; PETER H. GLEICK ET AL., U.S.
GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, WATER: THE POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF
CLIMATE VARIABILITY AND CHANGE FOR THE WATER RESOURCES OF THE UNITED STATES 5-9
(2000); Kathleen A. Miller & Steven L. Rhodes, WaterAllocation in a Changing Climate:
Institutions and Adaptation, 35 CLIMATIC CHANGE 157, 157 (1997); Jonathan Adler,
Water Marketing as an Adaptive Response to the Threat of Climate Change (Case Western
Reserve Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper 08-08, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1097594.
239 See Holly Doremus, Water, Population Growth, and Endangered Species in the West,
72 U. COLO. L. REV. 361, 361 (2001).
240 See Allan R. Hoffman, The Connection: Water and Energy Security, ENERGY SEC. (Inst.
for the Analysis of Global Sec., Potomac, Md.), Aug. 13, 2004, at 1, 1, available at httpj/
www.iags.org/n0813043.htm; Burleson, supra note 199, at 212.
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conservation-tend to conflate decision making based on human and
organizational economic behavior (for example, response to incentives,
costs, and pricing, or policy models that anticipate economically self-
interested behavior) with private control and private market transac-
tions.24' One need not treat humans solely as economically self-interested
actors to recognize that economic behavior is at least part of the human
and institutional reality of society and its management of natural re-
sources. Therefore, the government must use economic principles, such
as pricing mechanisms, financial benefits, and return-on-investment
incentives, to achieve conservation and investment, at least in coordina-
tion with non-economic values and goals.242 However, use of market-
based or market-imitating mechanisms-or perhaps more accurately,
mechanisms assuming economic behavior-is not the same as private
control of water and the use of purely private market transactions to
allocate, manage, and distribute water. Public sector water system opera-
tors can and do use pricing structures to encourage conservation." Most,
or perhaps even all, large-scale "market" transfers of water rights have
been facilitated or even accomplished by government action.2" Strong and
secure protections of private property rights in water turn out not to promote
wealth-creating investments in water, but instead impede wealth-creating
innovations and result in costly intransigence in resolving water problems or
conflicts.245 In addition, given that water is a necessity for life, the market
system's foundations in an ability-to-pay distributional principle violates
fundamental human values that all people should be provided basic mini-
mum amounts of water for survival, regardless of socio-economic status.
24 6
These values require government action to effectuate them.
1 For examples of works that include both private markets for trading water rights and
economic incentives (for example, pricing) to conserve water as being related, see Adler,
supra note 238; see also Benedykt Dziegielewski, Strategies for Managing Water Demand,
WATER RES. UPDATE, Nov. 2003, at 29; TERRY L. ANDERSON & PAMELA SNYDER, WATER
MARKETS: PRIMING THE INVISIBLE PUMP (1997).
42 See Dziegielewski, supra note 241, at 31-32; Thompson, supra note 139, at 103; Frank
A. Ward, Ari M. Michelsen, & Leeann DeMouche, Barriers to Water Conservation in the
Rio Grande Basin, 43 J. AM. WATER RESOURCES ASSN. 237, 238-39 (2007).
' See Thompson, supra note 139, at 103; see also U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, CASES IN WATER CONSERVATION: How EFFICIENCY PROGRAMS HELP WATER
UTILITIES SAVE WATER AND AVOID COSTS, EPA REP. 832-B-02-003 7-48 (2002).
' See Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Importance of Getting Names Right: The Myth of
Markets for Water, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 317, 320 (2000).
See Arnold, supra note 144, at 37-39.
See supra Part II.
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B. The Case for Reconceptualization
The problems posed by water privatization in the United States
require a reconceptualization of the public and private nature of water
in the U.S. The current system trending towards private consumptive
rights in water is not working. Human rights principles and national
security policies, though, are insufficient to protect the American public's
essential interests in water for human life, ecological life, socio-cultural
life, economic life, and political life.
As discussed in Part IV.A, privatization and commodification of
water are unsustainable and fragmenting forces ecologically, temporally,
geographically, socially, ethically, politically, and even economically. The
examples are a legion: Atlanta's water privatization debacle; 7 failed privat-
ization ventures in Laredo, Texas, Felton, California, and East Cleveland,
Ohio;248 the severely stressed Colorado River;249 the conflict-ridden Upper
Klamath Basin in Oregon and northeastern California;2 0 the unresolved
and unsustainable demands on the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River
System in the Southeastern U.S.;2 ' the once-declining but now-recovering
Mono Lake;252 excessive groundwater pumping in Tucson, Arizona, Tampa,
Florida, San Antonio, Texas, and Massachusetts' Ipswich River Basin;253
and even emerging water crises.254 We need a system of water law that
achieves, or at least facilitates, healthy, sustainable, and integrated water
planning and management.
Moreover, the legal system reconceptualizes property rights, limits,
and duties when changed social conditions necessitate new legal principles
for the viability of society, government, and law.255 As U.S. Supreme Court
Justice Oliver Wendell Holems, Jr., wrote:
See supra Part IV.A.3.
See supra notes 80-86.
29 See ADLER, supra note 104.
250 See DOREMUs & TARLOCK, supra note 202.
251 See Ruhl, supra note 10.
252 See Arnold, supra note 144.
253 See GLENNON, supra note 142, at 35-50, 71-111.
254 See CHRIS WOOD, DRY SPRING: THE COMING WATER CRISIS OF NORTH AMERICA 23-108
(2008) (discussing problems to water supply resulting emerge from both increased flooding
and lack of snow).
255 See GILLILAN & BROWN, supra note 104, at 9-43; CHARLES F. WILKINSON, THE EAGLE
BIRD: MAPPING A NEW WEST 45-60 (1992); Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest
in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 674-75 (1988); see also Holly Doremus, Takings and
Transitions, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. J. 1 (2003); Eric T. Freyfogle, Context and
Accomodation in Modern Property Law, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1529 (1989); Ling-Yee Huang,
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The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experi-
ence. The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral
and political theories, institutions of public policy, avowed
or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with
their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the
syllogism in determining the rules by which men should
be governed.256
Moreover, water law in the U.S., in particular, has been characterized by
change:
Water law is characterized by what I call a principle of legal
fluidity: water law changes as needed to adapt to changing
social and natural conditions. For example, the first land-
owners in the Western United States would have expected
that the riparian doctrine of water rights would apply, just
as it did in the Eastern United States and in the English
common law. However, a change in the status quo was
needed if the arid West was to be settled and made eco-
nomically productive. Likewise, in the East, the traditional
natural flow doctrine had to give way to the doctrine of
reasonable use in light of changing economic and social
needs.... And although the public trust doctrine is an-
cient and theoretically has always limited water rights in
California, new ecological knowledge and changing social
needs dictate that prior appropriation rights cannot be so
immutable as to allow destruction of an essential ecosystem
and habitat.257
We are in the midst of dramatically changing social conditions
with respect to water and its control and management.258 Scarcity in
particular locations and at particular times has become a major problem,
not only in the traditionally arid West but also in the traditionally humid
East. Population growth, sprawl, and consumption patterns create increas-
ing demands for water, change the locations at which and the purposes
Fifth Amendment Takings and Transitions in Water Law Compensation (Just) for the
Environment, 11 U. DENY. WATER L. REV. 49 (2007).
256 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMEs, JR., THE COMMON LAw 1 (1923).257 Arnold, supra note 144, at 38-39 (internal citation omitted).
2 This paragraph summarizes changing social and ecological conditions that have been
discussed throughout this article.
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for which water is sought, and degradation of watershed lands. Climate
change will contribute substantially to increasing water stress and scarcity.
Terrorism poses risks to water supplies and infrastructure. Extraction and
exports of both groundwater and surface water increasingly harm source
waters, watersheds or aquifers, and communities. Inter-jurisdictional con-
flicts over water have proven persistently unresolved under current dis-
pute resolution and inter-jurisdictional allocation methods. Our water
consumption practices are unsustainable, and public policies and norms
to protect natural and human environments increasingly conflict with
water rights and use. We also are beginning to understand how ecological
harms and modifications to watersheds' functioning pose human health
risks and harms. We also now understand that both nature and society
are complex, adaptive systems that are interdependent, dynamic, and
require integrated, adaptive management of natural resources.259 Water,
in particular, is the subject of "wicked" problems that require adaptive
governance because decisions (and conflicts) over policy goals cannot be
separated from decisions (and conflicts) over methods of achieving these
goals.26 At the same time, our faith in the private sector to act in the
public interest and regulate itself has greatly eroded.261 Moreover, our
understandings of democracy's legitimacy has shifted from faith in
interest group pluralism to the imperative that policy making result from
participatory, deliberative, transparent processes.262 The current system
259 See GARYJ. BRIERLEY & KIRSTIE A. FRYIRS, GEOMORPHOLOGY AND RIVER MANAGEMENT:
APPLICATIONS OF THE RIVER STYLES FRAMEWORK 15-363 (2005); C.S. HOLLING, ADAPTIVE
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT (1978); JOHN H. MILLER & SCOTT E.
PAGE, COMPLEx ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS: AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTATIONAL MODELS OF
SOCIAL LIFE 3-32 (2007); Ronald D. Brunner & Tim W. Clark, A Practice Based Approach
to Ecosystem Management, 11 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 48 (1997); R. Edward Grumbine,
What is Ecosystem Management?, 8 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 27 (1994); A. Dan Tarlock,
The Nonequilibrium Paradigm in Ecology and the Partial Unraveling of Environmental
Law, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1121 (1994); Jonathan Baert Wiener, Colloquium, Beyond the
Balance of Nature, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POLY F. 1 (1996).2 60 ADAPTIVE GOVERNANCE, supra note 202, at vii-viii.
261 See Marvin D. Jones, Narratives of the Fall: Bubbles, Bailouts and the Social
Construction of Economic Crisis 2 (Univ. of Miami Legal Studies Research, Paper No.
2008-40 (Nov. 25, 2008)), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1307077.
262 See JOHN S. DRYZEK, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND BEYOND: LIBERALS, CRITICS,
CONTESTATIONS v-vii (2000); JOHN FORESTER, THE DELIBERATIVE PRACTITIONER:
ENCOURAGING PARTICIPATORY PLANNING PROCESSES 115-116 (2001); Eileen Gauna, The
Environmental Justice Misfit: Public Participation and the Paradigm Paradox, 17 STAN.
ENVTL. L. J. 3, 4-5 (1998).
20091 835
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV.
of privatized, commodified water control and use is not working. We need
new institutions, governance methods, and concepts of water law.
It may be a misnomer, though, to label legal principles treating
water as an essentially public resource as a reconceptualization, because
water law is a highly contested and confused area of law. Despite privat-
ization trends and practices, the foundations of water as a public resource,
such as the state ownership doctrine and the public trust doctrine, are
strong in the U.S. legal tradition. Even though some would argue that
public and public sector rights in water merely set some outer boundaries
on private water rights in a very limited set of circumstances, there are
many counter-examples of the public nature of water being essential to
the definition of property and regulatory interests in water. At the least,
the legal conceptualization of the public and private characteristics of
water is confused, contested, and badly needing systematic resolution.
C. The Principles and Duties of Public Stewardship of Water
Therefore, I propose a reconceptualization of water, which I call
"public stewardship of water." It has three core principles. First, water
and water services should be under public ownership and control, yet sub-
ject to recognized private interests that are usufructuary in nature and
regulated by the government for the public interest. Second, because of
the unique characteristics of water, private property rights in water should
be characterized as property interests in water that are part of intercon-
nected webs of interests. Third, the government should have fiduciary
stewardship responsibilities to the public for management and governance
of water, water systems, and watersheds: a broadly based trustee role facili-
tated by all members of the public-the beneficiaries of this trust- having
correlative duties or responsibilities to their fellow beneficiaries in the
public at large.
First, the basic legal and policy premise in the United States is
that water is a public resource, owned and controlled by the government,
subject to the limits and fiduciary duties discussed below. This principle
effectuates foundational legal theories in the United States concerning
the state ownership of water,"' the limits that the public trust and the
2m3 See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 537.110 (West 2009); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-3-3 (West
2008); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 2-8 (1894); Bamford v. Upper Republican Natural
Res. Dist., 512 N.W 2d 642,647-52 (Neb. 1994); Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 105, at 350-
51 n.193.
836 [Vol. 33:785
WATER PRIVATIZATION TRENDS IN THE U.S.
public interest impose on private water rights," and the provision of
public water supplies as a municipal or governmental function.2" Defining
water as a public resource, subject to government ownership or control,
does not mean that private property interests in water are not recognized
and protected, but simply that these interests are inherently subject to the
public's interests and therefore can be limited and regulated as needed to
protect the public's interests. In addition, the public sector can contract
with private companies to provide certain public water system functions or
to design, build, and/or operate such systems, if private sector involvement
would upgrade systems or improve service to the public. These contracts
should provide the companies with satisfactory performance-based returns
on their investments and/or management expertise, but all water supply
system contracts with private entities should be subject to conditions and
safeguards to protect the public's interests and to ultimate government
ownership and control of the water systems and supplies themselves.
Second, private property interests in water are defined by the
unique characteristics of water, which is not merely an economic com-
modity protected by abstract legal rights, but is also an element of nature
with physical, chemical, biological, and ecological characteristics, and an
element of society with social, cultural, political, religious, and ethical char-
acteristics.266 In contrast, the trend towards privatization of water in the
United States is grounded in a concept of water rights as ownership rights,
much like land. This concept uses a once-dominant metaphor of property
as a bundle of rights or bundle of sticks that can be treated abstractly
as discrete commodities in private markets.267 Nonetheless, distinctions
26 See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-203A(5)(e) (2009); NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-289 (2008); N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 143-215.22L (West 2008); UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-8 (West 2008);
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469,479-82 (1988); Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois,
146 U.S. 387,473-75 (1892); Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Ct., 658 P. 2d 709,732 (Cal.
1983); In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 439-56 (Hawai' 2000); United
Plainsmen Ass'n v. N.D. State Water Conservation Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d 457,460-62 (N.D.
1976); GILMAN & BROWN, supra note 104, at 37; Sherk, supra note 114, at 5, 47-49.
265 SAX ET AL., supra note 109, at 681-746.
266 See Eckstein, supra note 179, at 963 (exploring the variety of water values and ethics);
Charles W. Howe, Protecting Public Values in a Water Market Setting: Improving Water
Markets to Increase Economic Efficiency and Equity, 3 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 357, 361-64
(2000) (exploring the non-economic values and characteristics of water); Salzman, supra
note 50, at 94-97; Wade, supra note 47, at 192-94 (recommending a new water manage-
ment system that takes a broad, integrated approach to "the multiple characteristics and
functions of water relative to human beings, ecosystems and economies").
2 7 See Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, The Reconstitution of Property: Property as a Web
of Interests, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 281, 284-91 (2002).
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between public control and private control of land, water, and other
natural resources exist far more clearly in theory or ideology than in
social and legal reality. 8
A more accurate metaphor for property is that of a "web of inter-
ests," which I developed and described in a 2002 Harvard Environmental
Law Review article.2 11 With the web-of-interests metaphor, many differ-
ent persons, entities, and even communities can be recognized as holding
varying types of recognizable interconnected interests in the object of the
property interests, and each interest can be legally recognized and pro-
tected based on the nature of the relationship between the interest-holder
and: a) the object of the interest, and b) the other interest-holders and
their relationships with the object.27 ° Moreover, the characteristics of the
object at the center of the web are critical in defining the nature and
scope of the property interests in the object.27' In particular, property
rights in water are defined with respect to the unique characteristics of
water and the shared interests in water, serving
to define property rights [in land and water] with respect
to good stewardship, not just consumptive, autonomous
entitlements.... The owner has duties of care to the object
itself and the natural and human environment to which
the land or water is integrally connected. The owner also
has duties of care to others who share interests in the land
or water, particularly given the interconnections of natural
resources, extending beyond property lines.272
Sandra Zellmer and Jessica Harder have applied this web-of-
interests concept to property interests in water.27 They believe that the
concept should be used to determine whether water should even be private
268 See FREYFOGLE (1998), supra note 104, at 145; FREYFOGLE (2006), supra note 104, at
189; GILLJIAN & BROWN, supra note 104, at 37; WILLIAM JOSEPH SINGER, ENTITLEMENT
(2000) (explicating a social relations concept of property based in social conditions and
practices); Dellapenna, supra note 104, at 545-54; Getches, supra note 104, at 183-233;
Tarlock, supra note 104, at 527-30; Zellmer & Harder, supra note 104, at 691-99. See
FREYFOGLE, supra note 18, at 157-201 (analyzing public and private interests in land
with its ecological and community characteristics, with a particularly thoughtful critique
of the privatization of landscapes).
269 See Arnold, supra note 267.
270 See id. at 283, 316-331.
" See id. at 335-37.
272 Id. at 351-52.
" See Zellmer & Harder, supra note 104, at 715-24.
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property.2"4 In analyzing the characteristics of water and nature of the
many interests held in water, Zellmer and Harder conclude that water
should be treated only partially as property: property for procedural due
process and common law purposes, but not property for which compensa-
tion is due when it is limited by regulation (i.e., regulatory takings prop-
erty).275 They argue that the public trust doctrine is the frame of the web
of interests in water, and that the communal and natural characteristics
of water prevent it from being fully property.
27 6
Other analyses of property interests in water have also focused on
the characteristics of water and the nature of multiple interests in water
to address problems of private control and use. For example, Jim Salzman
has pointed out that one of the primary problems with water privatization
is that it has focused solely on the economic characteristics of water, while
ignoring the social, cultural, political, physical, and natural characteristics
of water. 7 Christine Klein argues against trans-basin transfers and trade
in water, because water is connected to and a part of particular water-
sheds.27 She observes that allowing trans-basin diversions of water facil-
itates and stimulates unsustainable growth in areas not meant for large
water-consuming populations.2 9
Third, we should be less focused on abstract human rights and
national security fears per se and more focused on public stewardship of
water. The state government primarily, but also the federal government
to the extent of federal responsibilities and interstate jurisdiction and
local governments to the extent that states have delegated authority or
control over water resources to localities, should be charged with fidu-
ciary responsibilities for the ownership, management, conservation, and
supply of water as a trustee for the public. This trust concept is broader
than the traditional public trust doctrine, yet is more focused than a
guardianship/non-ownership concept. It contains six specific duties: secu-
rity, conservation, sustainability, equity, investment, and long-range, place-
based planning. In addition, the duty contemplates public responsibilities,
not just government responsibilities. I will address each of these points.
274 See id. at 724.
275 See id. at 732-45.
276 See id. at 744-45.
277 Salzman, supra note 50, at 97; see also Conca, supra note 229, at 132-33 (referring to
site-specific conflicts over special socio-ecological systems, such as rivers, that "are, at
once, foundations of local livelihood and culture, critical ecosystems, and extractable
commodities with transnational market value").
278 See Klein, supra note 153, at 259-74.
279 See id. at 275-78.
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The public trust doctrine is a partial conceptual and legal founda-
tion for the public stewardship concept that I begin to sketch in this essay.
The public trust doctrine imposes fiduciary duties on the state government
to hold, manage, and regulate navigable and tidal waters and their sub-
merged lands for the benefit of the public, who hold an equitable interest
in these resources.' 0 Grounded in ancient Roman law doctrines that came
to the U.S. from English legal tradition, the public trust doctrine serves
as a significant inherent limit on private property interests in water and
aquatic land, as well as a source of authority for the government to regu-
late private property without owing just compensation.2"' The California
Supreme Court has extended the public trust doctrine to the state's on-
going fiduciary obligation to balance water appropriation and use rights
with the public's enduring interest in the ecological conditions of flowing
waters in their natural water courses.2"2 The Hawaii Supreme Court has
extended the public trust doctrine to groundwater.283 The New Jersey
Supreme Court has limited the public transfer of public water supplies
based on the public trust in public water supplies.2" The public trust doc-
trine has proven capable of evolution.2 5
However, the public trust doctrine, as it is currently defined, is far
too limited to ensure the kind of government stewardship of water, water
supplies and systems, and watershed functions for the public that we now
need. In many states, there are substantial limitations on the waters and
"See Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709,726-28 (Cal. 1983); J.B. Ruhl
& James Salzman, Ecosystem Services and the Public Trust Doctrine: Working Change
From Within, 15 SE. ENVTL. L.J. 223, 224-26 (2006); Jack Tuholkse, Trusting the Public
Trust: Application of the Public Trust Doctrine to Groundwater Resources, 9 VT. J. ENVTL.
L. 189, 214-21 (2008); Erin Ryan, Comment, Public Trust and Distrust: The Theoretical
Implications of the Public Trust Doctrine for Natural Resources Management, 31 ENVTL.
L. 477, 478 (2001).
281 See Nat'l Audubon Society, 658 P.2d at 718-19, 723; Just v. Marinette County, 201
N.W.2d 761, 767-72 (Wis. 1972); Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 105, at 350-52 & n.193;
Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 280, at 223-24, 235-36; Tuholkse, supra note 280, 214-21,
234 n.299; Ryan, supra note 280, at 492.282 See Nat'l Audubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 728.
283 In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 445 (Hawai'i 2000).
284 City of Clifton v. Passaic Valley Water Comm'n, 539 A.2d 760, 765-67 (N.J. Super.
1987) ("While the original purpose of the public trust doctrine was to preserve the use of
the public natural water for navigation, commerce and fishing,.... it is clear that since
water is essential for human life, the public trust doctrine applies with equal impact upon
the control of our drinking water reserves." (internal citation omitted)).
' See Michael C. Blumm & Thea Schwartz, Mono Lake and the Evolving Public Trust
in Western Water, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 701, 720-38 (1995); see also Matthews v. Bay Head
Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355, 365 (N.J. 1984).
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lands to which it applies, the scope and enforceability of government duties,
the specific public trust purposes or rights that the public enjoys under
the doctrine, and the doctrine's impact on private rights and interests in
water or land.' As Robin Craig has pointed out, the public trust doctrine's
meaning varies from state to state.287 Moreover, even where courts issue
bold opinions expanding the scope of the public trust doctrine, the practical
application of this doctrinal development depends on non-legal factors,
such as environmental activism, public education and engagement, political
power, funding and other resources, collaborative problem-solving pro-
cesses, and available conservation methods.288
Carol Brown has made a strong and thoughtful argument for a sub-
stantial expansion of the public trust doctrine's scope.289 Mary Wood has
argued that the law should recognize a core state trust responsibility for
natural resources generally, because of the public's strong interest in these
resources and the unalterable peril that our environment now faces with-
out enforceable government responsibilities to safeguard it. 2" Embracing
the basic foundations of the arguments that both Professors Brown and
Wood articulate, I urge a broadly defined public trustee responsibility for
water, water supplies and systems, and other aquatic resources, emerging
out of both the public trust doctrine and emergent and urgent social needs,
but not unduly limited by the parameters of the public trust doctrine as
applied historically in the United States. In fact, the concept of the govern-
ment as a trustee of resources for the public is not confined to the public
trust doctrine and water-related resources. Courts treat the government
as trustee of public streets, parks, and sidewalks for the benefit of the
public and its expressive activities.291' An insightful analysis by Gerald
' See Carol Necole Brown, Drinking From a Deep Well: The Public Trust Doctrine and
Western Water, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 6-30 (2006); Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative
Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrine: Classifications of States, Property Rights, and
State Summaries, 16 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 14-24 (2007); Ruhl & Salzman, supra
note 280, at 224-29.
17 See Craig, supra note 286, at 26-113.
2See Arnold, supra note 144, at 33-44.
89ee Brown, supra note 286.
oSee Mary Christina Wood,Advancing the Sovereign Trust of Government to Safeguard
the Environment for Present and Future Generations (Part I): Ecological Realism and the
Need for a Paradigm Shift, 39 Envtl. L. _ (forthcoming 2009); Mary Christina Wood,
Law and Climate Change: Government's Atmospheric Trust Responsibility, [2008138 Envtl.
L. Rep. News & Analysis (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10652 (2008); Mary Christina Wood, Nature's
Trust: Reclaiming an Environmental Discourse, 25 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 243 (2007).
1 See Timothy Zick, Space, Place, and Speech: The Expressive Topography, 74 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 439, 444-45 (2006).
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Torres makes the case for treating the atmosphere-the skies, clean air-
as a common asset held in trust by the government for the public.292 John
Locke's compact theory of government, influential in U.S. political theory,
conceives of the government as a trustee with obligations to the public. 3
The trust concept that I outline here bears some similarities to Bob
Adler's concept that the government has guardianship duties for water and
related lands that are part of aquatic ecosystems. 4 However, Professor
Adler's concept is premised on a distrust of the law of trusts to hold the
government accountable for responsibilities to environmental interests,
and not just to human interests.295 It is integrally tied to a non-ownership
classification for water and aquatic lands and ecosystems. 6 While the
conceptual foundations of Professor Adler's non-ownership doctrine have
certain ecological and ethical appeal, I have practical concerns about the
capacity of the U.S. legal system-and the system of water management,
allocation, and use-to implement such a doctrine. It is not clear what the
duties of the government as a non-owner "guardian" of aquatic ecosystems
would be and how they would be enforced by the public and the courts. The
concept has a strong preservation element, which is much needed, but it
does not have much content related to the management of the existing
water infrastructure, distribution systems, and allocation patterns that we
have, including security and investment concerns. Government ownership
of water and water systems provides the government the authority to act
affirmatively, not just to protect against harm. Of course, non-ownership
might help people to think about their responsibilities for aquatic ecosys-
tems, but it also might be used by people, institutions, and even courts to
treat water as if no one has responsibility for it. Moreover, I am not as skep-
tical as Professor Adler that ecological responsibilities cannot or will not
be integrated into enforceable duties to the public under a trust doctrine.
In particular, the government's fiduciary duties with respect to
water should include six duties: 1) the duty of security; 2) the duty of
conservation; 3) the duty of sustainability; 4) the duty of equity; 5) the duty
of investment; and 6) the duty of long-range, place-based planning. I will
attempt to sketch out each of these six duties to the extent practical in an
Article of this nature, recognizing that further development is required.
2See Gerald Torres, Who Owns the Sky?, 19 PACE ENvTL. L. REv. 515, 533 (2002).
2 3 See Donald L. Doernberg, "We the People". John Locke, Collective Constitutional Rights,
and Standing to Challenge Government Action, 73 CAL. L. REv. 52, 63 (1985).
Adler, supra note 153, at 201-269.
295 Id. at 268-69.
2 Id.
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First, the government should have the duty to maintain the secu-
rity of waters and water supplies and infrastructure. This duty should,
of course, include the government's responsibility for measures to safe-
guard the public's water supplies and infrastructure from acts and risks
of terrorism, as discussed previously in Part IV.C. These measures should
include government control of water supplies and infrastructure, precau-
tionary measures, new security technology, new or upgraded infrastructure,
and adaptive coordination between law enforcement and water managers.
However, it should also include the government's use of its planning, man-
agement, regulatory, and enforcement powers to secure public water sup-
plies from the threats of scarcity and long-term unsustainability, whether
from over-consumption, waste, drought, flood damage, degradation and
pollution, or other sources. Moreover, the government should have a duty
to the public to resolve or at least diligently seek to resolve major conflicts
over water resources, because such conflicts can be a threat to water secur-
ity. A particularly good example of ideas about adaptive governance that
integrate water allocation and management issues with water security
issues is a report issued by the Guelph Water Management Group at the
University of Guelph in Canada: Water Allocation and Water Security in
Canada: Initiating a Policy Dialogue for the 21st Century.297
Second, the government should have a duty to conserve water
resources and to induce consumers' conservation of water. Water is not
just a good for human consumption. It is also a resource that can be or can
become non-renewable due to the locations, methods, rate, and degree of
its use. In addition, water is natural capital that supports all biological
life, natural processes, communities, the economy, society, and future
generations.29
A good conservation policy must embrace the economic charac-
teristics of water and the role of market-not necessarily privatized-
mechanisms for inducing conservation by consumers.299 For example, we
know that when water consumers do not pay the actual costs of water, or
pay decreasing or flat rates as their water consumption rises, they tend
to waste water, and that both price and metering can be used to reduce
27 ROB DE Lotg ET AL., WATER ALLOCATION AND WATER SECURITY IN CANADA: INITIATING
A POLICY DIALOGUE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (Guelph Water Management Group 2007),
available at http://sustsci.aaas.org/files/deLoe-et-al2007_FinalReport.pdf.
" See Harold A. Mooney & Paul R. Ehrlich, Ecosystem Services: A Fragmentary History,
in NATURE'S SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS 13 (Gretchen
C. Daily ed., 1997).
2 See DE LOEE ET AL., supra note 297, at 12.
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water demand. °0 Marginal-cost pricing principles, metering, increasing
block rate pricing structures, seasonal rates, excess-use penalties, avoid-
ance of volume discounts normally should be used as means to promote
water conservation. 30 ' To the extent that low-income members of the public,
or even all members of the public, need or should be entitled to minimum
amounts of water for basic human needs (i.e., the amount needed to sus-
tain a human life), the government could partially or totally subsidize
up to 13 gallons of water per person per day, and price all the remaining
amount at rates to encourage conservation. According to Robert Glennon,
this would result in only 3.8 billion gallons of free or subsidized water per
day, out of over 408 billion gallons of water per day used for all purposes
in the United States in 2000.302
However, regulation of water use may also be necessary, particu-
larly in times of drought or emergencies, to achieve conservation when
pricing mechanisms by themselves may not produce sufficiently rapid
change in consumption or does not change certain price-inelastic behaviors.
In addition, equity, social ethics, and public perception may require that
all water consumers share in the responsibility of reducing consumption
in times of drought or emergency, even if some wealthy consumers are
willing to pay for high-use, even wasteful, practices. Regulation of this sort
might include date or time restrictions on lawn watering or car washing,
or requirements that fountains be turned off.
More importantly, public entities need to develop comprehensive,
multi-faceted conservation policies that achieve maximum conservation
outcomes, especially in light of the severe challenges that many commu-
nities face or will face. The Pacific Institute, in its evaluation of Atlanta's
conservation policies, lists forty-seven conservation measures water dis-
tricts commonly use to conserve water by reducing demand, including:
conservation rates/pricing; water audits (both systemic and specific uses);
retrofitting various water uses with more efficient equipment or materials
(e.g., toilets, car washes, turf); rebates for more water-efficient appli-
ances; regulations governing landscaping, water waste, retrofitting,
water recycling, and water pressure; public and professional education
programs; use of specific low-tech methods such as rain barrel catchment
0 Dziegielewski, supra note 241, at 29-34; Thompson, supra note 139, at 103-04; Ward
et al., supra note 242, at 247-50; Adler, supra note 238.
301See TERRY L. ANDERSON & PAMELA SNYDER, WATER MARKETS: PRIMING THE INVISIBLE
PUMP(Cato Institute 1997); Thompson, supra note 139, at 98,103-04; see also Dziegielewski,
supra note 241, at 29-39; Holly Stallworth, Conservation Pricing of Water and Wastewater
(Apr. 10, 2000), available at http://www.wrb.ri.gov/wapacmeetings/fees/epapricing.pdf.
3 See Glennon, supra note 18, at 1896.
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or swimming pool and spa covers; public sector use efficiencies (including
xeriscaping public properties); metering, sub-metering, and dedicated
metering water budgets; and others. 3 '
Third, the government should have a duty to control and manage
water for the long-term sustainability of all human life, biological life
generally, watersheds and hydrologic processes, local communities, and
society. The core of this duty is the concept that all life depends on water
for survival. Moreover, this sustainability duty contemplates that the
individual human, the social system, and nature are interdependent on
one another for long-term sustenance, vitality, and viability. With respect
to water, ecological sustainability and social sustainability should not be
framed as inherently in conflict, even if specific choices and water uses
may involve tensions between anthropocentric and ecocentric goals and
values.3 °4
Several scholars provide valuable guidance about what sustain-
ability in water resource control, management, and use might mean. At the
broadest level, Eric Freyfogle, Christine Klein, Bob Adler, Sandra Postel,
and others have articulated a public and private stewardship responsibility
for the health and integrity of the ecological communities, of which water
is a critical and integrated component, and human communities, for which
water is an essential element with multiple meanings and functions.3"5 At
a slightly more specific level, Jeffry Wade urges the use of a tool known
as "integrated water resources management" ("IWRM"), which contains
fourteen principles, including integration of water management, environ-
mental management, and land use planning "conjunctively with codepen-
dent natural resources, namely soil, forests, air and biota;" use of a systems
approach that is attentive to individual components, interdependent link-
ages, and the role of disturbances and resilience; "full participation by all
stakeholders" in transparent, accountable, adaptive, and locally-based
decision making; attention to the social impacts of water policies; im-
provement of information availability, information use, and institutional
303 See PACIFIC INSTITUTE FOR STUDIES IN DEVELOPMENT, ENVIRONMENT, AND SECURITY,
A REVIEW OF WATER CONSERVATION PLANNING FOR THE ATLANTA, GEORGIA REGION 34-35,
tbl.7 (2006), available at http://www.pacinst.org/reports/atlanta/atlanta-analysis.pdf.
0 For a brief but solid assessment that a perceived conflict between anthropocentric and
ecocentric perspectives on sustainability "is merely a pseudo-problem," see Smagadi,
supra note 179, at 259.
30 5 FREYFOGLE, supra note 18; FREYFOGLE, supra note 104; POSTEL & RICHTER, supra note
142; Freyfogle, supra note 129; Klein, supra note 8; Klein, supra note 153; Adler, supra
note 153; Robert W. Adler, Addressing Barriers to Watershed Protection, 25 ENVTL. L. 973
(1995). See also HOLLAND ET AL., supra note 153; Arnold, supra note 153.
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capacity; equitable allocation of water resources; and regard for the "hydro-
logical, bio-physical, economic, social and environmental characteristics of
a catchment" when making decisions, among others. °6 Even more specifi-
cally, Dan Tarlock has identified nine characteristics of an environmen-
tally sustainable water use policy:
(1) the allocation or reallocation of water for the mainte-
nance of aquatic ecosystems and the restoration of degraded
riverine environments;
(2) the reallocation of water from marginal agriculture to
more efficient uses, both urban and environmental;
(3) the protection of rural, generally poor, areas that may
face the loss of water and livelihood opportunities;
(4) the protection of minority groups such as indigenous
peoples and others who have developed sustainable custom-
ary practices;
(5) the limitation of the mining of aquifers;
(6) the provision of water in times of scarcity for a wide
range of uses at a time when there is less support for large-
scale subsidized supply augmentation (e.g., dams);
(7) the integration of water quality;
(8) the adaptation to global climate change, which threatens
to alter rainfall patterns and create more extreme cycles
of flood and drought; and
(9) the development of more adaptive and inclusive decision-
making processes.3 °7
Fourth, the government should have a duty of equity with respect
to water control, management, and allocation. This duty requires that
water policies meet basic principles of social justice. Three particular prin-
ciples are especially important. The first is the principle that every person
in the United States should receive enough water to meet the basic needs
of life, regardless of ability to pay. This could be accomplished by public
water suppliers, through the imposition of a fiduciary duty, and by
private water suppliers, through utility regulation, having to provide a
minimal amount of water per person per month without charge, and then
charge for amounts exceeding this amount. Alternatively, the govern-
ment could provide water utility bill subsidies to those water customers
30 Wade, supra note 47, at 192-96.
30 Tarlock, supra note 104, at 530.
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who demonstrate financial need. The second principle is the govern-
ment's responsibility to protect vulnerable or disadvantaged communi-
ties from exploitation. One manifestation of this responsibility is
community-of-origin protections in the regulation of water transfers." 8
Another manifestation is protecting traditional communal water sys-
tems, such as the American Southwest's acequias in traditional rural
Hispanic communities, from displacement or erosion by state water
rights regimes.3 °9 The third principle is that water policies, plans, and
allocation decisions should be made through full, meaningful, and trans-
parent public participatory and deliberative processes, including efforts
to seek the input of low-income and minority communities, which have
been traditionally excluded from the exercise of power over water.31 °
Fifth, the government should have a duty to invest resources in the
development, management, maintenance, security, sustainability, and
conservation of water supplies, water distribution infrastructure, and the
restoration and preservation of waterways and critical watershed features.
As discussed previously in Part I.A.2, public water systems require sub-
stantial new investments for capital improvements to replace aging infra-
structure and meet safe drinking water regulatory standards. In the area
of water security, experts identify emerging and potential new technologies,
infrastructure, scientific knowledge, public health responses, and risk man-
agement methods to reduce potential risks to water supply and infra-
structure security.31' States and localities should be investing in these
emerging tools and methods to improve water security. In addition, the
policies of water conservation and long-range planning identified in this
part require significant public resources if they are actually to occur.
Finally, the government should have a duty to engage in long-
range, place-based planning for the sustainability, security, and conser-
vation of water supplies and watersheds. The other five duties will not
be achievable without planning. Short-sighted, fragmented, narrowly-
focused water planning must be replaced by long-range, holistic, broadly-
framed water planning."2 It must be broadly inclusive, participatory,
3 See Klein, supra note 153, at 268-72; Glennon, supra note 18, at 1889.
See Gregory A. Hick & Devon G. Pefia, Community Acequias in Colorado's Rio Culebra
Watershed: A Customary Commons in the Domain of Prior Appropriation, 74 COLO. L.
REV. 387, 399-404 (2003); Glennon, supra note 18, at 1889.
310 See Eileen Gauna, Environmental Justice in a Dryland Democracy: A Comment on
Water Basin Institutions, in WET GROWTH: SHOULD WATER LAW CONTROL LAND USE? 171-
201 (Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold ed., 2005).
311 See Ruhl, supra note 212, at 222.
"' See Getches, supra note 104, at 200-02.
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transparent, and accountable. It must be integrated with other types of
planning, such as land-use planning, emergency planning, and environ-
mental conservation planning."' 3 It should focus on the health, integrity,
and sustainability of entire watersheds, landscapes, and regional commu-
nities, not just on narrow engineering or distributional matters. Water-
sheds offer a functional scale at which to engage in planning, although one
must be aware of the variable scales and functions of nested watersheds
and the complex ways in which watersheds relate to the geographic scale
of other decision making activities, such as land use. 4 Moreover, the
planning should be connected to the water-based or water-related places
that people value and find special, which serve as geographically, socially,
psychologically, politically, and ecologically organizing frames of commu-
nity and identity. 1 One must be careful not to assume that the process
of planning necessarily means that we can presume to create a workable
static plan that anticipates all forces, changes, or processes working on
a particular watershed, water supply, water system, or socio-ecological
dynamic. Instead, watershed planning and management institutions must
engage in adaptive management." 6 However, the process of engaging in
long-range, place-based planning contributes to the development of insti-
tutions and their capacities to engage in healthy adaptive management
and stewardship of water.
These six duties identify the government as the entity with fidu-
ciary responsibility to act on them. However, unlike typical trusts, these
duties must also be shared by every member of the public and the public as
a whole. While each of us is a beneficiary of the government's ownership,
control, management, allocation, conservation, and stewardship of water,
each of us also profoundly affects how the government's responsibility
for water is effectuated by the ways we use water, influence water deci-
sions, demand water, and affect water quality and watersheds through
313 See WET GROWTH, supra note 142; Arnold, supra note 153.
114 See Arnold, supra note 153.
315 See, e.g., Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, The Structure of the Land Use Regulatory System
in the United States, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 441, 468-70 (2007); Arnold, supra note
144, at 26-32; Arnold, supra note 153, at 328-336; Klein, supra note 153, at 260-63, 268.
See generally, Klein, supra note 8.
316 BRIERLEY & FRYIRS, supra note 259; C.S. HOLLING, ADAPTIvE ENVIRONMENTAL
ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT (1978); MILLER & PAGE, supra note 259; Ronald D.
Brunner & Tim W. Clark, A Practice-Based Approach to Ecosystem Management, 11
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 48 (1997); R. Edward Grumbine, What is Ecosystem Management?,
8 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 27 (1994); Tarlock, supra note 259; Wiener, supra note 259; see
also ADAPTIVE GOVERNANCE, supra note 202.
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a myriad of activities. We are co-beneficiaries but we are also co-trustees
or co-managers of waters, water supplies and systems, and watersheds.
The term "public stewardship" aims to capture this sense in which the
government and the public share responsibility for being good and wise
stewards of limited water resources that are essential to life, society, and
nature.
CONCLUSION
Water privatization in the United States raises a variety of human,
community, national, and ecological concerns as water scarcity becomes
a more significant issue in many parts of the U.S. and the world. As the
legal system and public institutions wrestle with the control, management,
and improvement of public water supply systems, waters, and the aquatic
infrastructure that supports both society and nature, they are essentially
wrestling with two different conceptions of water control, management,
and allocation. One-the current trend in many ways-is based in frag-
mented private property rights in water, market transfers of water to
those most able and willing to pay, and a commodification of water that
serves primarily or solely to satisfy ever-increasing self-serving consumer
demands. The other-the one represented by the public stewardship con-
cept identified here-is based in public ownership of water with recognition
and protection of private interests in water but subject to limits necessary
to achieve the security, conservation, sustainability, equity, support, and
integrated planning of water, water supplies, water infrastructure, and
watersheds. It requires both the government and the public-as individuals
and as a collective-to assume responsibilities of stewardship for our water
resources. This model is the one most likely to protect human life and
interests, national security, and the social and ecological communities
that depend on water.
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